

ORIGINAL

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY 1913-21
BURO STAIRE MILEATA 1913-21
No. W.S. 365

ROINN  COSANTA.

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY, 1913-21.

STATEMENT BY WITNESS

DOCUMENT NO. W.S. 365

Witness

Colonel Thomas Fox,
General Headquarters,
Parkgate St., Dublin.

Identity

Quartermaster, 3rd Cavan Brigade
from January 1922.

Subject

- (a) Reorganisation of I.V.'s. Belfast post 1916;
- (b) Execution of Inspector Swanzy, August 1920;
- (c) Northern Ireland subsequent to signing of Treaty 1921.

Conditions, if any, stipulated by Witness

Nil

File No. S.1499

Form B S M 2

ORIGINAL

BURO STAIRE MILEATA 1913-21

NO. W.S. 365

STATEMENT BY COLONEL THOMAS FOX
FOR THE BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY.

Following the "Rising" of Easter Week, 1916, many of the leading officers of the Belfast Brigade of the Volunteers were interned in England and Wales. Without leaders, the Volunteer movement weakened and was in danger of becoming extinct. Many of its members had given up their association with all things military.

At this stage the G.A.A. served the useful purpose of holding the various parts of the revolutionary forces together. The O'Donovan Rossa G.A.C. was formed by a Corkman named Sean O'Sullivan, and Sean Kelly and Seumas Dempsey of Belfast. Under the guise of training for games a considerable amount of military training was carried out and lectures were delivered at the Club premises in Divis St.

The training which consisted of route marches, physical drill and close order drill, was frequently observed by plain clothes R.I.C. men.

Shortly after the internees were released in December, 1916, the Volunteers were reformed in Belfast. Belfast formed one battalion and Antrim and East Down each one battalion. Sean Cusack was the Brigade Commander and Leo Murphy his Adjutant.

The 1st Battalion consisted of four Coys., "A", "B", "C" and "D". "A" Coy. commanded by Joe McKelvey and "B" Coy. by Sean Kelly; the others I cannot remember.

Drills were held outdoor weekly, either on Saturday or Sunday afternoons, or when the attentions of the police became too pressing under cover of darkness. The Coy. strength ranged from 20 to 40 of whom about 20 were regular in their attendance at the drills. These drills consisted principally of close order drill, extended order

drill, signalling and very frequently of rifle practice with small bore rifles. The training ground was a few level fields on the top of Divis mountain.

This type of work continued until 1918 when the imposition of conscription was threatened, which gave a great impetus to Volunteer recruiting and succeeded in directing the thoughts of the Volunteers to the possibility of there being another fight at no distant time. This brought in its train a desire to obtain arms and ammunition to be ready when the time arrived, and thenceforward the work proceeded with a new keenness.

Arms were obtained by either purchase from British soldiers, dealers, Ulster Volunteers or by raids. In 1919 a raid was made on Riddell's, a gunsmith's shop near College Street, in which a number of shot guns and revolvers were secured. Explosives were obtained by a raid on a quarry at Hannastown, and gradually a fair amount of offensive weapons of various kinds Snyder rifles, Lee-Enfields, Lee-Metfords, Mausers, Martini-Enfields, Martine Henris, Steyers, shot guns of all bores, revolvers and automatics, was collected.

Early in 1920 a decision to attack Dundrum, Crossgar and Ballynahinch barracks was made. These operations were attempted but without success.

In April 1920 instructions were received from G.H.Q. to destroy the Income Tax papers in the City on the Saturday preceding Easter. There were four different Income Tax offices, and a party was detailed for each job. "B" Coy. was allotted the main task at the Grant Central Hotel which had been taken over by the British.

The selected night was very wet, and the streets were

crowded with shoppers. The porch of the Hotel was full of people sheltering from the rain when two Volunteers dressed as telegraph boys pressed through the throng and gained admission to the Hotel, which at this time was locked up. The caretakers family were secured, and the remainder of the party who had been waiting in the porch were then quietly admitted. The Income Tax papers were duly burned and the party got clear away although all the centre of the city was being carefully watched by detectives and police. The conflagration provided a spectacle for an excited crowd and was enjoyed by some of its creators.

The other parties were equally successful in their work and not a single hitch occurred anywhere.

In July, 1920, the pogrom broke out and Volunteers were employed in protecting churches, convents, etc. from the Orange mobs. At the Sacred Heart Church in Ardoyne a particularly fine fight was put up by a few Volunteers against a large well-armed mob whose designs on the Church were thereby frustrated.

At the beginning of August instructions were received for the execution of District Inspector Swanzy who had been indicted by a Jury for the murder of Tom McCurtain in Cork earlier in the year. Swanzy had been moved from Cork to Lisburn for his own security.

Lisburn is a small market town with a predominantly Protestant population, and I think with but one Volunteer in the whole town. At this time a state of tension prevailed, Catholics had been beaten and others threatened, and information was therefore difficult to obtain about the police movements.

It was decided to have a reconnaissance made so as to establish the regular habits of Swanzy, and the most suitable time to deal with him. A Volunteer was sent to Lisburn who knew the town well. He discovered that Swanzy visited a certain Church for service on Sundays. It was thereupon decided to carry out the execution on the following Sunday, 15th August.

On Saturday a number of Corkmen, five or six in all, among them being S. O'Donovan, Sean Culhane, Leo Aherne and Dick Murphy arrived in Belfast. I understand that it was the wish of Michael Collins that justice should be meted out by fellow citizens of McCurtain.

It had been arranged that a taxi would be hired by R. McCorley and Sean Leonard on Sunday, and on reaching a certain place on the road the driver was to be seized and imprisoned in an old house nearby. This part of the plan was carried out, and the party boarded the taxi. Before going very far the car broke down and we had no option but to abandon the operation for that day. It should be mentioned that the taxi-driver had been commissioned to drive to Stoneyford which is not on the direct road to Lisburn. This precaution was taken so as to prevent, in case of a hitch, any suspicion arising in Swanzy of there being any connection between the event and designs on him. All the Corkmen left Belfast that evening.

It was decided by Joe McKelvey that we should carry out the plan ourselves on the following Sunday. Roger McCorley was sent to Lisburn on Thursday to keep daily contact with Swanzy's movements. On Wednesday Sean Culhane and another Corkman, Dick Murphy, returned to Belfast, and on being acquainted with our plans concurred in them.

On Saturday we cycled to Lisburn to give Culhane and

Murphy an opportunity of seeing the town, and the place chosen for the execution, and to complete arrangements with McCorley for meeting him next day.

Our plan briefly was to have Leonard - a Volunteer - who was himself a taxi-driver, meet us at the railway station in Belfast and drive us to Lisburn when we were to meet McCorley who would then know where Swanzy was to be found. After the completion of the job we were to return half way to Belfast, avoiding the route used the previous Sunday, leave the taxi, which was to be driven into town by Leonard, and walk across the mountain into Belfast.

Everything went like clockwork. Swanzy was at Church when we arrived. Our taxi was parked about two hundred yards away and as fortune would have it in front of a doctor's house. The engine was kept running. After waiting some time Swanzy appeared, walking in company with two other men. On reaching us he was shot dead. Many hundreds of people were at this time coming out of the churches, of which there are four in the town, and the street was crowded. We succeeded in reaching the taxi, although one brave old whitehaired gentleman tried to stop us with a walking stick, another - a British Officer - attempting the same thing escaped with his life, a bullet cutting the stick out of his hand. The remainder of the plan worked without a hitch and Culhane and Murphy returned to Dublin that evening.

There are some peculiar events to relate in connection with the affair:-

- (1) After the shooting the party arrived at the taxi, one after the other, and on looking back I could see no sign of McCorley. I got out of the taxi, which was moving slowly ahead, and as I did so McCorley climbed in on the other side. The jerking of the car as he climbed in caused him to discharge the last round in

his revolver which went through the seat I had just vacated. Volunteer Leonard was arrested in Belfast later that evening, courtmartialled and sentenced to death which was subsequently commuted to a life sentence. He had refused to go "on the run" after the shooting relying on the similarity of the events concerning the acquiring of taxis on Sunday 15th August and Sunday 22nd August to provide him with a defence in the event of his being arrested. I believe he would have been acquitted if a copy of "An t-Oglach" had not been found in his digs.

- (2) There was only one car readily available for the police in which to follow us. It stood near the place where the execution occurred. It was suggested that we should damage it before leaving, but in the excitement it was forgotten. The police commandeered it and followed us. Our car could not exceed 30 M.P.H. whilst the police car was much faster. We had a good start, but must have been overtaken before long, if, in going round a sharp corner too quickly, the pursuing car had not pulled off two tyres.
- (3) On coming down from the mountain we had to cross one of the roads leading towards Lisburn. This was held by a police patrol, who were stopping everybody and questioning them. Luckily for us, who were then unarmed - having been met earlier by Joe McKelvey and Charles McGill who took over our guns, we were approaching them from a direction other than from Lisburn and we were allowed to pass.

As a result of the execution the pogrom was pursued with increased activity, practically every business house of a Catholic in Lisburn being burned to the ground and amongst them being that of W. Gilmore, the sole Volunteer in Lisburn previously mentioned.

The necessity for defending themselves, their homes and institutions did not prevent the Volunteers pursuing the war against the British in Belfast. Every opportunity was seized of procuring arms and in making the men proficient in their use.

In September, 1920, it was decided to attack an R.I.C. patrol at Broadway and disarm them. The police resisted and two were shot, one fatally, whilst one Volunteer - A. O'Hare - received a flesh wound in the arm. All the arms were seized.

As a reprisal the R.I.C. shot John Gaynor, E. Trodden and McFadden. Gaynor was a Volunteer, but the others were not.

Shortly after this I went to Tyrone and thence to Cavan, so that I have no further personal knowledge of the events in Belfast until the Truce.

The military situation in Cavan at the beginning of 1921 was far from satisfactory. For a considerable time previously the Volunteers were used for all political purposes, so much so indeed that they had completely lost sight of the main purpose of their existence - to fight. The county was almost completely devoid of arms, the only weapons in the hands of the Volunteers being shot guns, and the only weapons to be used by them up to this time were stones with which on one occasion the police were bombarded.

For the purpose of organisation G.H.Q. divided the county into two parts, East and West Cavan. Pat Woods (Major P. Woods late of the Western Command) was appointed organiser for West Cavan and Peadar McMahon (present Secretary to the Department of Defence) to East Cavan. Before much

useful work could be done P. McMahon was arrested. He was succeeded by Sean Gallagher who was of an entirely different type. He was by no means a politician and in such a politically saturated atmosphere his work did not fructify. In addition, his carelessness in regard to detail and his personal safety led eventually to his arrest. He really left the area in a worse condition than he found it. No arms had been obtained and dissatisfaction was rife in many of the units on whom Gallagher's sharp tongue had fallen.

Seumas McGoran (Col. S. McGoran) followed Gallagher. His first task was to revive the militant spirit in his area. He reorganised the area into four battalions, Carrickallen, Madabawn, Knockbride East and Knockbride West, and appointed Commanders and Staffs, arranged for training to be carried out and lectures to be given.

Arms were the most urgent necessity of the Volunteers. They could not be procured in the county, and without arms the people who had them, the police and soldiers, could not be tackled. Undoubtedly there were a few revolvers and shot guns and these might have been used. At a Brigade Council meeting orders were given by McGoran to the battalion commanders of Knockbride East and Madabawn to attack an R.I.C. party which visited a bank on regular days in Cootehill. The details of the plan were left entirely to them and any help they required would have been forthcoming. The following day one of the Battalion Commanders notified McGoran that they had decided that the task was beyond their powers, because they had not sufficient experience in the use of the revolver.

This event determined McGoran in having a flying column organised at once. The equipping of the force with arms was the difficulty. He applied to G.H.Q. for arms with but a most inadequate response, and Belfast in reply told him that

he could only have the arms if he took Belfast Volunteers with them, with which to form the column. Without arms nothing could be done so he agreed to the terms of Belfast, with the proviso that as soon as sufficient weapons had been procured from the police and Military these men would be replaced with Cavan men.

The rifles and ammunition were smuggled in to Redhills by train in travelling rugs carried by Cumann na mBan from Belfast. No praise is too high for these ladies. When carrying the first consignment they were stopped in Belfast and questioned by the military and at every stopping place the carriages were inspected by detectives and police. Three journeys were made to complete the consignment.

It was decided to have the column assemble at Lappinduff about 7 or 8 miles from Cootehill, and from there to begin their operations. From the 5th to the 6th May the members began to arrive at Redhills, and on the night of the 6th/7th May the column, 15 all ranks, marched across to Lappinduff. The local companies had been detailed to provide for the security of the force on its arrival at Lappinduff.

The district contained a mixed population of Protestant and Catholic farmers, the former being completely hostile.

I had accompanied the column on its march from Redhills and then cycled over to Drumlaney near Belturbet to collect some clothing and arms. I arrived back at Lappinduff at about 3 a.m. on the 8th May. Only the sentries and guards were awake.

At daybreak a shot was heard and a sentry came into the house to say that British Military had us surrounded. I asked the column commander to keep the column under cover in the house until I could go out and make a reconnaissance, because

I knew the ground better than they. This was agreed to and I started off only to be recalled before I had gone a hundred yards to find the column commander giving orders which resulted in his losing complete control of his men and whose object I could not follow. However, I did as I was told which was to take up a position, which eventually proved to be on the extreme right flank. Another Volunteer, Sean McDermott, accompanied me. No further orders were issued to us and I could only see two others of our party who were in position apparently in the centre.

Our position was on the forward slope of high ground facing east overlooking a little valley with houses dotted here and there. To the right of the valley was a hill which shut off our view in that direction.

Whilst moving to my position I could see members of the column running down the hillside towards a house from which British soldiers and police were firing. Sean McCartney was killed at this time.

The rising sun was shining brilliantly in our eyes, and it was difficult to locate objects in the valley. After some time I distinguished British soldiers and police at different places in the valley with whom we exchanged shots; they made no attempt to advance against us. Suddenly on our right where the hill was located I saw soldiers dashing from behind cover to reach our hill. Their purpose was obviously to outflank us. I succeeded in stopping some of them but others, including an officer, got across and after some time fire was opened on us from the hill above us. Between the fires from above and below it was impossible to move. Others of the column who had less cover than we had were in a hopeless position. In the excitement nobody had thought of bringing a sufficient supply of ammunition to last for a couple

of hours or more, and at this stage, about 7 a.m., very little was left. Shortly afterwards the party in the centre having exhausted their ammunition surrendered, and our position having become untenable with only two or three rounds left and there being no way of escape we also surrendered.

It subsequently transpired that about fifty soldiers and police had been concentrated as the result of information given by a local Protestant farmer, and had surrounded, under cover of darkness, the area in which we were known to be. The local Volunteer companies had completely neglected their duty of protection, and no warning was given of the British movements until they were observed by the sentry.

We were removed to Cavan Military Barracks and thence to Belfast where we were tried by Courtmartial and sentenced to death for "high treason and levying war on his Majesty the King". The truce intervened to save our lives and in Jan. 1922 we were released from Mountjoy Jail, Dublin, to which we had been removed.

During our imprisonment in Belfast Jail we made an effort to escape. The plan was as follows:-

Sean O'Neill, Roger McCorley and Seumas Woods, - O'Neill dressed as an R.I.C. Sergeant and the other two as British officers, were to present themselves at the outer Jail gates, and having gained admission were to hold up the warder and open the inner gates and secure the soldier who was on sentry duty in the yard behind these inner gates. A platoon of soldiers was on guard duty in the jail. Meanwhile the warders on duty inside were to be seized by prisoners who were allowed "association". These men were political prisoners convicted of trivial offences, such as

being in possession of "An t-Oglach", and were thus known as "papermen". They were allowed to visit each other's cells on certain evenings when all the other prisoners were locked up. The various parts of the plan were co-ordinated by means of signals between the jail, i.e. from our cell windows and St. John's Home.

The warders inside were duly seized, the keys secured, and the selected prisoners released from their cells. These prisoners consisted of those sentenced to death, those sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and those charged with offences likely to incur the death penalty.

Meanwhile outside the three Volunteers previously mentioned had gained access to the inner gates and the warder was held up. He, however, recognised Sean O'Neill who had been a prisoner there previously with Austin Stack, and in addition the whole episode was observed from within the gates by other warders who gave the alarm. The sentry promptly fled, but almost immediately the remainder of the guard were on the scene and the three Volunteers were lucky to get away, a fortunate circumstance having prompted McCorley to keep the outer wicket gate open. The escape therefore failed. When I was released from Belfast Gaol in January, 1922, I went back to Cavan as Quartermaster, 3rd Brigade.

Whilst the war against the British had ended in July, 1921, it continued in the Six-County Area and the 5th Northern Division, which comprised the Volunteers of Counties Cavan and Monaghan, was engaged against the R.U.C. and British Military forces, as a means of reducing the pressure on the 3rd Northern Division (Antrim and Down) and as a reprisal for the arrest of General D. Hogan, Officer Commanding, 5th Northern Division, by the Six-County Government. There were

several engagements, particularly in the Clones Area, between the Volunteers and the R.U.C. assisted by British troops. In one of these, two patrol lorries of R.U.C. were ambushed at two places on the same night in February, 1922, and their arms captured. At another, R.U.C. and British patrols were engaged in the vicinity of Castle Saunderson near Newtownbutler. Captain Matt. Fitzpatrick was shot dead at Clones railway station whilst in charge of a party of Volunteers intercepting about 50 R.U.C. travelling by rail from Belfast to Enniskillen. Known 'B' Specials in the Six Counties were seized and held as hostages. All these activities were executed as part of a concerted policy approved by G.H.Q. and of which Seumas Woods, Officer Commanding, 3rd Northern Division, and Colonel S. McGoran would have more knowledge than I.

With the setting up of the Boundary Commission activities gradually ceased, and when the civil war broke out the Six-County problem was shelved and forgotten, but not by the Northern Government which continued the arrest and internment of Volunteers who had been known to be active.

Perhaps I should mention that as evidence that activities were being directed by the Volunteers against the forces of the Six County Government after the truce, my brother Fred sustained wounds from which he died on 22nd August, 1921. It happened in this way. He with Volunteer F. Crummy acting under orders from Joe McKelvey were keeping Commissioner Smith, R.U.C., under surveillance, and were in the vicinity of his house when they were accosted by one of the detective guards. Crummy drew his revolver and the detective grabbed it. Fred then shot the detective but as he did so he himself was shot by the gun for which the other two were struggling. Both Crummy and Fred then made off and although he was mortally wounded in the stomach - the bullet went

14.

clean through his body - he managed to travel about half a mile before collapsing. He died in hospital ten days later. Crummy was the son of the Division Intelligence Officer Frank Crummy.

T. Fox

COLONEL.

(T. Fox).

25 March 1950.

Witness

John Mc Coy.
25/3/50

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY 1913-21
BURO STAIRÉ MILEATA 1913-21
No. W.S.

*Original carbon copy of original document in my possession**J. J. O'D.*COPY.

Dublin.

29th Sept., 1922.

To:
Commander-in-Chief.

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY 1913-21
BURO STAIRE MILEATA 1913-21
No. W.S.

As, I am inclined to believe, the attitude of the present Government towards its followers in the Six Counties is not that of the late General Collins, I am writing this Memo. with a view to ascertaining from you what exactly the position of my Division is now and is likely to be in the future relative to G.H.Q. and I would also like to know through you what Policy the Government has for its followers in the Divisional area.

When the Treaty was signed in December last we were given to understand by General O'Duffy that although the Six Counties did not benefit as much as the rest of Ireland by it still it was the best that could possibly be got at the time and it was the intention of the Dail members and the members of G.H.Q. Staff who supported it to work and try to overcome the Treaty position with regard to Ulster.

During the three months following the signing of the Treaty I am satisfied that G.H.Q. did their best to assist the Army in the Six Counties and when the split came in March I recommended to the Officers and men to stand with G.H.Q. as I considered by so doing we were giving the people who supported the Treaty a better chance of overcoming the position in the North.

After the outbreak of hostilities between G.H.Q. and the Executive there was the danger that the position in Ulster would be more or less overlooked and allowed to drift and in order to have a definition of our position and of the policy of the Government here I asked for a meeting of the senior Officers of the Six Co. area with G.H.Q. Staff.

2.

Before that meeting was held I sent you a Memo. dealing with the events in the Division from the time I took over command and outlining the position generally at the end of July as regards the morale and tactics of the enemy, the morale of our troops and the morale of the Catholic population and their attitude towards the I.R.A.

On August 2nd the meeting was held and the late Commander-in-Chief presided. At that meeting the situation in the Six Counties was discussed at great length with a view to improving our Organisation and training and deciding on a Policy to be adopted by our people in the North and which would have the sanction of the Government in Dublin. The late C-in-C. outlined the Policy we were to adopt - one of non-recognition of the Northern Government and passive resistance to its functioning. At the same time from the military point of view we were to avoid as far as possible coming into direct conflict with the armed forces of the Northern Gov. and any action on our part would be purely protective. The late C-in-C. made it clear to us that the Gov. in Dublin intended to deal with the Ulster situation in a very definite way, and as far as this Division was concerned every Officer present felt greatly encouraged to carry on the work when we had a definite Policy to pursue and an assurance that the Gov. here would stand by us.

After the death of the late General Collins it was encouraging to us to see that the Government were determined to carry out his policy. I took it that this meant his policy regarding Ulster also.

A new situation has now arisen. F. McArdle was up a fortnight ago with the President regarding the course of action to be adopted by our people in connection with the signing of a declaration of loyalty to H.M. the King and the

3.

Northern Gov. which that Gov. is imposing on certain people and I expect through time will impose on every citizen in the Six Co. area. McArdle informed me that the President brought the matter before a meeting of the Cabinet and the decision was that the Gov. in Dublin had no objection to our people signing this. Owing to the position that has arisen in the rest of Ireland I take it the Government feel they are not equal to the task of overcoming the Treaty position regarding Ulster. If it is their intention to recognise the Northern Gov. it is well they should be acquainted with the present position in Ulster and also have an idea of what the future of Ulster is likely to be as we visualise it.

There is grave internal trouble in the Northern Gov. When their terror policy was broken by our campaign of burning and destruction in Belfast, they turned to a policy of placation towards the Catholic population and when this proved fairly successful (we, of course, were at this time becoming inactive owing to the War in the rest of Ireland) they began to dispense with a number of their Specials. A desire for peace became popular amongst the better classes and the Northern Gov. took up the task of restoring order in good faith. There had been a number of high officers in their Police force who had been given unlimited powers during the terror campaign notably D.I. Nixon and all his Staff. Such people while they were in power would always be a menace to peace and during the past few months have been pressing for promotion and reward for "distinguished service" i.e. Murder. The Northern Gov. in their desire for peace have refused promotion or reward and D.I. Nixon was asked to resign. He is at present organising the disbanded Specials and has threatened to lead them against the N.G. on the same lines as the Irregulars in the South. He has also warned Col. Wickham,

4.

Inspector Gen., R.U.C. and the City Commissioner of Belfast that their lives are no longer safe. Last week Nixon & Co. attempted to shoot up the Catholic districts of Belfast in the hope that the I.R.A. would take the field and it would become evident to the N.G. that there was a necessity to strengthen their forces rather than deplete them. I have issued special orders against retaliation until we see how the Official forces of the N.G. are going to deal with this trouble. In a particular area last week in Belfast the Official Specials returned the fire of some of Nixon's gang; this is a great change in Belfast.

Owing to the capture by us of all the files and military plans from H.Q. R.U.C. and the office of General Solly Flood, Craig's Military Adviser, the N.G. have been holding enquiries in all their departments and the position at the moment is that every Official is suspecting the other.

Recognition of the N.G., of course, will mean the breaking up of our Division. None of the Divisional, Brigade or Battalion Officers could remain in the area except under War conditions and that only for a short time and even under guarantees from the N.G.? if such will be arranged, these men would not be safe from unofficial murder-gangs. With the departure of these Officers it will not be possible to maintain the I.R.A. organisation which is the only Irish Organisation in the Six Counties at the present time. The breaking up of this Organisation is the first step to making partition permanent. If this must come then there is very little hope of organising in Ulster on Gaelic lines for a long time.

The Government here has still a certain responsibility to its followers in the Six Co. area and the

5.

following points will require their serious consideration:-

- a. The question of our prisoners who are not recognising the N.G. as per late C.in.C's instructions.
- b. The position of the people who assisted us during the War against England and who are now singled out for harsh treatment by the N.G.
- c. The position of our Officers and men who have lost their means of living because of their activities against England.
- d. The position of our Officers and men from Co. Antrim and Co. Down who are mostly of the farming class and who cannot return to their homes and whose people are accordingly victimised.
- e. The question of people who have come away from their area for no reason whatever and on the plea of being refugees have been taken into Gov. positions in Dublin. This is encouraging emigration.

On these points it is essential for me to have a definite ruling from you and I would be glad if you could let me have this by Tuesday next 3rd prox. Everyone is anxious to know how and where they stand.

Beir Beannacht,

(Signed) S. Woods.

O/C., 3rd Northern Division.

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY 1913-21
BURO STAIRE MILEATA 1913-21
No. W.S. 365