

RUNDA

Unit History

39 Inf Bn ONUC

APRIL — OCTOBER 1963

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UNIT HISTORY - 39 INF BN

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UNIT HISTORY - 39 INF BN ONUC

PART I - OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

Political Situation.

In February 1963 the military action undertaken by ONUC against the Kat Gendarmerie had been successfully concluded, and NO further organised resistance from the secessionists was to be anticipated. Mr. TSHOMBE was still Pres of Kat, but his power was drastically curtailed by the appointment of Mr. ILEO to E'VILLE as Central Govt Min of State for Katangese affairs. Mr. ILEO's veto was sufficient to nullify any decision of the Kat Parliament, so that Mr. TSHOMBE was now no more than a figurehead; frustrated by his impotence, and disillusioned by the precipitate collapse of his European officered armed forces.

Later by enactment of the Parliament at LEOPOLDVILLE the Province of Katanga was dismembered: three separate "Provincettes" were created: NORTH Katanga, with ALBERTVILLE as Capital; EAST Katanga with E'VILLE as capital; and SW Katanga to be known as LUALABA with KOLWEZI as capital. These measures consigned Mr. TSHOMBE to a political wilderness and under threat of arrest for a continuation of subversive activities he left KOLWEZI by stealth on the night 13/14 June and arrived in PARIS two days later; for reasons of health it was claimed: and the claim was NO doubt justified!

EX-GENDARMERIE

The terms of surrender provided for the enlistment in the ANC of all Kat Gendarmerie in the ranks they held at the moment of capitulation. Many offrs - including the C-in-Chief, Gen MUKE, - availed of this concession; but the lower ranks were less trusting, and only a very small number, - initially less than 10%, - registered. The remainder, many of them still in possession of their personal weapons, scattered either individually or in groups throughout Southern and Western KATANGA, and into ANGOLA and N RHODESIA. UN intelligence - such as it was:- suspected that the heavy weapons were transported to ANGOLA by rail immediately before the surrender at KOLWEZI of the Kat Gend. It was also believed that the greater proportion of the 300 European mercenaries in TSHOMBE's pay had gone no further than ANGOLA; that there they had assembled some thousand of ex Kat Gend, and were in training for an invasion of KATANGA, for the purpose of re-establishing a separate state, on the departure of ONUC. The only rail and road crossings of the R. KASAI, which separates ANGOLA from KATANGA - are at the small town of DILOLO, which still remained unoccupied by Central Govt or ONUC Forces on the assumption of duty by the 39 Bn.

The continued existence of parties of armed ex Gendarmerie constituted a two-fold menace viz:

- a. It challenged the ability of the Central Government to impose its rule on KATANGA and:-
- b. It jeopardised the lives and the property of the local citizens.

For practical purposes the latter was the greater threat; for while capacity of the Ex-Gendarmerie to engage in large scale operations was

exceedingly low, no one doubted their ability or willingness, to indulge in acts of banditry against isolated individuals, or small communities.

Sector D (see Map).

The area for which the 39 Bn was given responsibility was known as Sector D and comprised approx $\frac{2}{3}$ of the new province of LUALABA. Apart from the highly developed region around KOLWEZI, and the border town of DILOLO it contained no towns of any importance, but the fact that it shared common frontiers with N. RHODESIA and ANGOLA automatically designated it as a sensitive area, and made the locating and picking up of ex Gendarmerie a very formidable task. The sector was also recognised as the last refuge of die-hard secessionism.

Tribes.

There are representatives of many tribes in the Sector, but broadly speaking the LUNDA (pro TSHOMBE) and the TSHCKWE (anti-TSHOMBE) were the most influential. Old antagonisms between these two were never very far below the surface, and were likely to erupt into open conflict at any moment.

KOLWEZI.

This town of 3,000 - 4,000 European inhabitants was surrounded by seven African cites or communes. The total African population could not be precisely determined, but was somewhere between 65,000 and 80,000. Six of the cites had been built by Union Miniere (UMHK), (1) at the site of mines, and factories, and were efficiently controlled and administered by UMHK. The cites of MUSONOI and KOLWEZI were adjacent to the main town: the others were at considerable distances from KOLWEZI.

The Bn advance party was brought on an orientation tour of the cites' by M. PETERS Security Offr UMHK in Apr, and subsequently all Offrs on the Bn Stand-to roster were required to become familiar with routes, lay-out etc. as the cites were a potential source of trouble

The seventh cité, C.E.C., (2) a 'suburb' of KOLWEZI, had a heterogenous collection of some 23,000 souls of various tribes, and many callings, (including a fair percentage of unemployed). It was constructed at random, was squalid and unhygienic, and could usually be relied on to provide troubles of various kinds.

Thirty years ago, the site on which KOLWEZI now stands was as insignificant, and as sparsely populated, as any of the bush country which constituted the remainder of Sector D.

The rapid growth of population, and advanced building programme, were due to the discovery of fabulous quantities of very accessible mineral wealth.

In order to meet the various manpower demands, African workers were gathered from all parts of KATANGA and KASAI: hence the variety of tribes which now inhabit the area. The European employees of Union Miniere, were predominantly BELGIAN - of mining-district origin.

(1) The zinc producing factory of METAIKAT, while not directly under local control of UMHK, is included for purpose of convenience.

(2) C.E.C. cité extra-coutumier; "town outside 'the Pale'."

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They were highly paid, beautifully housed, and settled in a most pleasant climate. Generally their way of life in Africa was immeasurably superior to that in which they were reared; and they resented the 'wind of change' which deprived them of their hitherto undisputed power over the African.

UMHK

Since Union Miniere (UMHK) had built, developed, and controlled KOLWEZI its higher echelon found it difficult to adjust to the hand-over of power to the Central Government. Being a business organisation it was not at all interested in the altruistic aspects of African development; and indeed the sole guarantee that it could continue to operate economically, lay in keeping together its highly trained scientific, technical and administrative staff of Europeans. It was also very much in the interests of the Central Govt to keep production at its maximum, and although there was much resentment at the support given by the Europeans to Katanga's secessionist effort, the wiser heads in Govt saw clearly the necessity for creating a climate of security for the European families.

SOGEELEC

Simultaneously with the development of mines and factories, an extensive hydro-electric scheme was undertaken. The artificial Lac DELCOMMUNE was created, and very modern hydro-electric generating plants were established at DEL COMMUNE and LE MARINEL. The controlling organisation was known as SOGEELEC. The power lines stretched along South KATANGA, and into N. RHODESIA; and the production of copper in parts of both states, was dependant on an uninterrupted flow of power from these plants.

ANC.

The only real threat to the safety of the Europeans came from the ANC (Armee Nationale Congolaise). The 8th Bn which occupied KOLWEZI and other points in Sector D had been hastily assembled in LULUABOURG in 1961, and despatched precipitately to N. KATANGA, where it had remained for 2 yrs in desultory, and unsuccessful combat with Kat Gend. It was inadequately officered, - both as to numbers and quality, - was badly disciplined, poorly trained; and was supplied with food, transport, and munitions, in that haphazard and uncertain fashion which seemed to be characteristic of the methods then in vogue in the new Congo. A large percentage of the Offrs and men had left wives and families behind them when they were moved from LULUABOURG, and many had not since had an opportunity of re-visiting them. All those factors contributed to low morale, and to a sullen and hostile attitude to the Europeans.

Many of the ANC now considered themselves to be in hostile territory; and there was an extreme, and ill-controlled element, who wished to exact fitting retribution, for the hardships and indignities, they had suffered at the hands of TSHOMBE's Gendarmerie, and the Europeans. Some of their Officers subscribed to these extreme views; and those who did not, could not be relied on to make the voice of reason prevail, nor to exercise the degree of authority which is the accepted standard in European armies.

On the other hand there was a strong intransigent body of Europeans and Police, who did not want the ANC on any terms, and who took no pains to conceal their contempt for them: an attitude which justified the extremist element in the ANC, and complicated the UN effort at reconciliation.

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Police.

The police had not been in any way reorganised since the ending of secession, hence all the police in Sector D had but lately owed allegiance to Mr. TSHOMBE's Govt.

During the 39 Bn stay in KOLWEZI the Police continued to wear the uniform and distinctive symbols of KATANGA. This had to be countenanced by the Central Govt, who had not yet got around to providing replacements. The Police looked rather well, but proved to be of little worth in times of crisis.

Civil Adm.

Ostensibly the system of local adm was a continuation of that which the Belgians had established: with a District Commissaire who was responsible for the area which corresponded to the Province of LUALABA. The District was divided into four parts, - or Territories, - each of which had its own Commissaire.

In fact the system worked poorly, or not at all, because of the inefficiency of the Congolese personnel who had replaced the Belgians. The Congolese administrators in general had only a rudimentary education, had no experience of exercising command; and appeared to be more interested in self-prestige, (and concomitant emoluments) than in serving a useful function for the good of the community. In times of crisis, - such as food shortages, and evacuation of refugees, - ONUC or UMHK were invariably called on to provide a solution.

ONUC Civ Reps.

ONUC also maintained at KOLWEZI a small civilian staff, the principal member of which was designated Provincial Observer. As the responsibilities of this official were not defined, nor were his functions too evident, his role was NOT well understood, either by himself, or by Mil Comd Sector D. An attempt by O/C 39 Bn at clarification by recourse to Kat Comd on 6 May yielded no positive results. Thus there was some friction when the Provincial Observer attempted to meddle in matters, for which existing orders made Comd Sector D directly responsible to GOC Kat Comd.

There were three changes in the office of Provincial Observer between May and Oct 63, each one making for a more harmonious relationship. Finally a good measure of understanding and co-operation existed, when Mr. P. WILLIS then Provincial Observer, occupied himself with political and economic matters, leaving questions of order and security to be resolved by the Military Commander; with consultation, and agreed lines of conduct, on problems in which there was no definite line of demarcation.

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SECTION II

Relief of the 38 Infantry Battalion

An Advance Party of forty-five all ranks of 39 Infantry Battalion arrived in ELIZABETHVILLE on 11 April 1963 to take over duties from 38 Infantry Battalion. The Advance Party proceeded to KOLWEZI on the following day, less a rear party who remained in ELIZABETHVILLE. The hand-over and relief operation continued throughout the period ending 2 May on which date the final elements of the 38th Battalion departed from KOLWEZI. The main body of the 39th Battalion arrived in KOLWEZI during the period 1st to 5th May. The hand-over of duties and the orientation of the incoming Staff, because of the adequate time available and the full co-operation and assistance from the outgoing 38th Battalion Commander and Staff, was most satisfactory.

Dispositions on Relief

The dispositions of the 38th Battalion were adopted by the 39th Battalion, initially. Elements of the Battalion were located as follows:

- a. Battalion HQ and Headquarter Company : KOLWEZI Town.
- b. "A" and "C" Company Groups and Armoured Car Group : CAMP RUWE (two miles NE of KOLWEZI).
- c. "B" Company Group : KOLWEZI AIRFIELD (two miles SE of KOLWEZI).
- d. One Platoon, "A" Company Group : LUALABA BRIDGE (20 miles East of KOLWEZI).

These dispositions conformed to Battalion security requirements.

Duties and Responsibilities

Katanga Command, with HQ at ELIZABETHVILLE, comprised three Sectors:

- a. Sector "B" - The ELIZABETHVILLE Area (Ethiopian Brigade).
- b. Sector "E" - The Jadotville Area (Indonesian Battalion).
- c. Sector "D" - The KOLWEZI/DILOLO Area (39th Battalion).

Sector "C", the KAMINA Area (SWEDISH Battalion), previously in this Command, was brought directly under control of HQ ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE on 1 May 1963.

The OC 39th Battalion held the ONUC appointment of OC Sector "D" and was charged with the following responsibilities:

- a. To ensure that law and order was maintained in the Sector.
- b. To neutralise quickly and efficiently any attempts by any one at disturbing the peace.
- c. To ensure the freedom of UN troops in the Sector by patrolling.

39th Battalion operated a Movement Control Post at KOLWEZI airfield. One Helicopter with a NORWEGIAN crew detached from the Air Support Squadron, ONUC, was attached to Sector HQ, initially.

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Manpower Problem

The Bn could not continue for long to maintain all the posts occupied by the outgoing 38 Bn: the numerical disparity between the Units precluded this. The immediate hand-over of buildings at ELIZABETHVILLE, and the transfer of all Bn stores to KOLWEZI, as a man-power economy measure was an urgent necessity, and measures were put in train to have this done. Operation Dilolo brusquely intervened however, and instead of economising in man-power the 39 Bn was to be immediately stretched to breaking point.

Conservation of manpower forced the abandonment in mid-May of the post at LUALABA Bridge - a post of first rate importance in maintaining road and rail communication with JADOTVILLE and E'VILLE. A system of road patrols by B Coy was initiated as a substitute, but the decision to withdraw the permanent garrison was taken with reluctance, - and not without feelings of apprehension on the part of Bn Comd and Staff.

DILOLO

The immediate occupation of DILOLO by the ANC was thought by the Central Government to be an essential security measure, its purpose being to cut off from KATANGA those Gendarmerie who had fled to ANGOLA. But the ANC in its present state could not be relied on to carry out the task: if opposed it would probably flee, if unopposed butcher the population. A preliminary period of occupation by ONU in the role of precursor to the ANC was the solution arrived at in LEO. O/C 39 Bn was summoned to KAT Comd for consultation on 9th and 10th May and the obvious difficulties of such an undertaking by the 39 Bn at this juncture were pointed out: the low strength of the Unit vis-a-vis the 38; the necessity for first concentrating at KOLWEZI by evacuating E'VILLE; the desirability of getting all ranks oriented and acclimatised - the last elements of the Bn had arrived only 4 days previously; difficulty of setting up three supply points; these and many others. Operationally the move had a considerable element of risk involved, in that very little was known of the area between KOLWEZI and DILOLO, and of DILOLO itself, in relation to possible concentrations of ex-Gendarmerie forces, and their reactions to a small UN force; and the capability of the 39 Bn in particular, and the KAT COMD in general, to reinforce without delay, should the necessity arise, was questionable. The Swedish COS gave a patient and sympathetic hearing, and promised to support a postponement of the operation for 3 - 4 weeks. But his effort failed, and on 16th May A Coy with under Comd 1 Tp Armd Cars, 1 tpt pl (DANISH) and dets of Sigs, MPs, and medics, together with an AIRLO, and a LO of the ANC set out at 0730 hrs from CAMP RUWE on its mission. Order for occupation (Appx A).

The details of the move to DILOLO and activities at DILOLO are given in this extract from Report of Comdt J. AHEARNE, OIC A Coy:-

The Move.

The Column moved from Camp RUWE at 0730 hrs on Thu 16th May; the going was very rough and the average speed of Column was as slow as 10 - 15 mph. The first night's Camp was at MUTSHATSHA, a fairly large village, 90 miles from KOLWEZI. The following day at 0800 hrs the move was resumed en route to KASAGI - a distance of 90 miles. Progress again was slow due to bad road conditions and some transport breakdowns. On this section of the route supply of fresh rations was by helicopter. The only serious problem met with on this section of route was a broken bridge, which had only a few rough planks as a means of crossing. Eventually,

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thanks to some improvisation, this was crossed successfully by all vehicles and KASAGI was reached at 1800 hrs. The interpreter was most uneasy at this stage and insisted there was trouble ahead. At a conference held later that night with the local Administrator and parliamentary representative, it was arranged to have the Dilolo Administrator meet the Column outside town. This was to be taken as an earnest of a welcome and peaceful entry into Dilolo. On 18th May move forward was resumed at 0800 hrs. The road conditions vastly improved - consequently rapid progress was made. As arranged the Column was met about 20 miles outside town by a party from DILOLO, which included the Administrator and Chief of Police. From there on there was plenty of evidence of welcome by crowds of friendly people on the roadway at each village and again in the town. The Airstrip was reached at 1700 hrs, camp established and airstrip inspected.

Activities and Associations

A conference was held that night in the Town and all aspects of local conditions discussed (except politics!) Having been assured again that all was calm and that local administration was in control, it was decided we would not interfere in local adm.

During our stay in DILOLO until 8th June, this arrangement worked well; frequent conferences were held in the Administrative office where all problems as they arose were fully discussed, and solutions arrived at.

Personnel were under canvas on the airstrip, and a system of daily patrols was put into operation. The Mission to hold the town of DILOLO was rescinded on 20th May by COS Katanga Comd, at the request of OC 39 Battalion, because of the undue dispersion involved. Security of the town was maintained by regular patrols. Except for a few machine-gun shelters in the airstrip, we did not find any evidence of Gendarmerie activity in the area.

The transport of the troops to DILOLO was supplied by a Danish Tpt Pl, and relations with these were very friendly at all times; they were most co-operative and hard-working.

This Pl was replaced by a Pakistani Pl half-way through our tour of duty in DILOLO; these also proved most co-operative and hard working. The Congolese liaison officer from the ANC, Capt Placide ILUNGA, was an excellent choice for the job. During his stay, his relations with all ranks were very good. The proposed stationing of an ANC Unit in DILOLO was strongly opposed both by natives and whites; this opposition was made very clear to us at the first few Conferences. Capt ILUNGA played a big part in countering this opposition, and by the end of our stay he had established firm friendships on all sides.

The ANC Unit of 2 Officers and 160 O/Ranks approx duly arrived, and occupied vacant farm bldgs near the town. Relations with these, once established were very good; at all times they acknowledged our authority in the area and all problems that arose were solved by discussion. Relations with the local Adm people, both Belgian and Congolese were good, at all times they were most helpful and co-operative. On our recall to KOLWEZI, both the ANC and local Adm people strongly expressed their regrets at our departure; all were anxious to have our stay extended.

In DILOLO contact was made with elements of the Portugese Army and after a few meetings relations became very friendly. Their Commanding

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Officer Lt Col PREGO was at all times most helpful, from him we got permission to draw our fresh water needs from their supply in ANGOLA. This was a much appreciated concession as river water was contaminated. On a few occasions also, Col PREGO invited the officers of the Unit to lunch in TEXEIRA, ANGOLA. On one occasion he also invited the ANC Officers. This was a magnanimous gesture on Col PREGO's part in view of the poor political relationships existing between the Governments of ANGOLA and the CONGO. In DILOLO we were fortunate in having Cpl McCAFFERTY of Cav who took on the task of French interpreter. We also employed a house boy for communication with local Congolese in addition to the official UN interpreter.

Public Relations

At Company level there was no organised effort in this direction but tribute must be paid to all ranks for the excellent image they portrayed to the public. The large fund of good-will built up by the Unit was evidence of the appreciation by the public of the high standards of discipline and conduct maintained by all ranks in their daily contact with them. Football matches were an excellent means of establishing friendship.

FORCE TRANQUILLISER

With A Coy at DILOLO and Lt P. MULCAHY's platoon of C Coy guarding stores at E'VILLE, the 39 Bn was now spread out over the whole of Southern KATANGA: its extreme elements were 460 miles apart.

At all levels the Bn was under severe pressure to meet its many commitments throughout the month of May, and indeed throughout most of its tour of duty. Duties rotated with bewildering frequency, but these inconveniences were cheerfully accepted by all ranks. Security was based on efficiency, mobility, and high morale, rather than on numbers.

It was evident that situations were likely to arise in KOLWEZI Town, which required to be quelled rapidly and effectively by 39 Battalion troops, displaying an intimidating show of force. Companies were required to keep small stand-to parties on immediate alert, but the relatively low strength of these parties demanded the presence of a larger follow-up force. To be effective, such a force required to be in a continuous state of readiness. The low strength and commitments of the companies introduced considerable difficulties in this respect, which were fortuitously offset by the armoured personnel carriers available to the Battalion. These APC's, six American and six Swedish, reduced considerably the number of personnel which would otherwise have been required; and it was possible, as a result, to organise a special infantry/armoured group available at all times, to deal with any local situation. This group, known as Force Tranquilliser, consisted of two reinforced rifle platoons mounted on six APC's and supported by two Ford Armoured Cars. It was established as an element of the Battalion's constant-alert forces on 24th May and continued in existence until the end of the mission. It was employed on a number of occasions in KOLWEZI Town, and proved to be most effective in dealing with riots and shooting affrays. The aggressive appearance of the armoured vehicles together with their mobility and protection, compensated for the lack of personnel normally available; and the knowledge that this group could intervene rapidly, played a large part in maintaining a reasonable state of law and order in KOLWEZI. Since the Cavalry Group was of insufficient strength to operate all of the vehicles simultaneously, an early decision was taken to have selected infantrymen (8 per Coy) trained as gunner drivers. This programme of training was quickly and satisfactorily accomplished by the Arm'd Car Group, and its results were far reaching. In the work of repair and maintenance of these cars, Capt HENNESSY's fitters displayed tireless energy, and made an inestimable contribution to the operational efficiency of the Bn.

WEEKLY CONFERENCES

At Bn HQ the main effort was directed towards improving attitudes and relationships between the ANC, the Police, and the civilians of both colours.

A system of weekly conferences was instituted on 1st May, where mutual problems could be discussed, and fears and suspicions allayed. The attendance included representatives of the DC (Commissaire De DISTRICTE, Police, ANC, UMHK (for ANC accommodation and similar problems), and the UN Provincial Observer; Comd Sector 'D' presided.

One of the main objects of the conferences was to clarify the role and responsibilities of the ANC in the Sector, as NO one - and least of all their Officers! - had a good understanding of this. It was a fundamental issue, and the failure of the higher command of the ANC to define the precise mission of the 8 Bn in Sector 'D' was to some extent responsible for their subsequent transgressions. The UN Sector Comd's authority was limited to operational command, and he had NO control over ANC disciplinary matters, but limited as this authority was, it endowed the Sector Comd with a standing which made him something more than an umpire during the debates.

The subjects raised covered such things as:-

- a. Demarcation of responsibilities ANC, Police and UN.
- b. Procedures for arrest and trial of drunken or otherwise unruly ANC.
- c. Arrangements for liaison between the three forces at all levels.
- d. Exchanges of information on special activities on patrols by ANC or UN.
- e. Co-ordination of MPC patrols.
- f. Airing of specific charges and complaints.

While the general system continued throughout the mission, the representation at the conferences was limited after a few months to military and police only; with the UN Provincial Observer in attendance for the purpose of conveying to the Civil administration, and UMHK such information or decisions as effected them.

Frustrations, - non attendance, and unpunctuality - were experienced; failures too, as NO satisfactory system of liaison was established; and it was left to Gen MOBUTU to drive home to the ANC the nature of their role in KOLWEZI area. But the conferences on the whole did have a fair measure of success, in removing misunderstanding and in establishing better relationships among the leaders of the various groups concerned.

In the case of the ANC, reluctance, or (perhaps) helplessness, to have word translated into action was manifested at a very early stage. For instance, complaints lodged against the ANC at the outset were firstly that their members were allowed into KOLWEZI under arms while off-duty, and secondly that they were taking over the functions of the Police in stopping and searching cars. The ANC representative, Major KASADI - an ex-TSHOMBOIST Gendarme - undertook to put an end to these irregularities; but within a matter of days new incidents of a similar kind incurred, and troops of the 39 Bn had to be called on to restore the situation.

REMOVAL OF ANC BARRIER

The first of these incidents was on Sun night 12th May when a message from a Police official gave 39 Bn Duty Offr to understand that the town was swarming with armed ANC, and that the population was in a state of panic. Immediate investigation by the Stand-to party revealed that while there was some truth in the report, it was grossly exaggerated, and the small armed party of ANC left for Camp without fuss, on request.

Four days later the spotlight was again on the ANC. This time they had halted and searched all cars, and roughly handled some of the occupants at a road check point $\frac{1}{2}$ way between KOLWEZI, and their Camp at DELCOMMUNE. Ostensibly they manned this check point (or barrier) for the purpose of controlling the movement of their own troops, and it was on this understanding that they were allowed by O/C 38 Bn to position troops there. Now O/C 39 Bn, having failed to contact any ANC Offr, (a recurring and frustrating theme), transmitted a written order for withdrawal from the barrier. The reaction was characteristic. They did indeed abandon the barrier, but promptly erected another some two miles away. A new order for removal, - this time giving a time limit - was ignored. Since the ANC came under operational Comd of O/C Sector D, this challenge to UN authority could not be overlooked.

The delicate task of seeing the order implemented was entrusted to a patrol of C Coy, with Armd Car Sp, under the comd of Capt John CLARKE. B Coy were ordered to be in a state of readiness to support, should resistance be met; and the patrol set out from Camp RUWE at 1100 hrs 18th May, an earlier recce party having reported the barrier still in position, and manned. Capt CLARKE encountered obstinacy, truculence, and some gestures of defiance; but his firm and patient handling of the successive levels of ANC hierarchy who came to palaver, abetted by the intimidating presence of armd cars and APCs, achieved the desired result. It also earned the approbation of the Force Comd by way of a message of congratulation to the patrol. A period of strained relations with the ANC was now anticipated. But on the afternoon of this day - 18th May - O/C 39 Bn went to LE MARINEL, having been incorrectly informed by UMHK LO that mediation was necessary in trouble that was brewing between the newly arrived ANC Coy and SOGELEC's Congolese workers. In fact, the ANC were formally parading their Coy as a gesture of goodwill to the inhabitants. O/C 39 Bn accepted Major KASADI's invitation to review the Coy, and deliver an address of welcome. The same Major KASADI was the principal culprit in non-compliance with the order to withdraw from the barriers. The ways of the Congolese are in many respects inscrutable!

OCCUPATION OF KOLWEZI BY 8 BN ANC

Towards the end of May a new crux arose, when the ANC; (now with one Coy at DELCOMMUNE and one at LE MARINEL) decided to complete the concentration of the 8 Bn by locating the Bn HQ and HQrs Coy in KOLWEZI town; this despite the fact that adequate space and facilities (having regard to their humble needs!) were available in DELCOMMUNE. The decision taken at Central Government level, had a politico-prestige rather than a military basis, and therefore the efforts of Comd Sec D to have it reversed had little hope of success, - although the probable consequences were obvious.

Major VANGU, OIC 8 Bn ANC, arrived for preliminary discussions about the middle of the month, and agreed that the Bn HQ element in the town be limited to the Bn Offrs and key personnel of the Staff, the total strength of which was not to exceed 75 all ranks. The remainder of the HQ Coy were to go to DELCOMMUNE Camp. This agreement was based on a variety of considerations, the principal one being the lack of any suitable site in KOLWEZI, in which this ungainly HQrs (280 all ranks!)

could be contained under control. But it suffered the fate of many another such agreement, and on 27th May, 8 Bn ANC occupied an ex-Gendarmerie Camp at LE BRIDON in undeterminable strength; established Bn HQrs in a house about two miles from this Camp; and dispersed families of Offrs (including "Adjutants") in a dozen or more UMHK villas in the general area of 39 Bn HQrs. Given well disciplined troops and peaceful conditions, such an untidy set-up would not commend itself; in prevailing circumstances it was an obstinate and foolhardy exercise in brinkmanship.

Exactly one week later, Whit Mon 4th June, the inevitable explosion occurred.

ANC WHIT MASSACRE

It was a holiday in KOLWEZI, and in one of the many crowded bars an altercation between some policemen and ANC soldiers, culminated in an exchange of shots. The ANC were quickly reinforced by a truck load of troops from LE BRIDON, who fired indiscriminately at anyone who happened to be in the vicinity. At LE BRIDON itself the troops occupied positions around the Camp, firing at passing cars, and at any other target which presented itself. In all, five Congolese and one European were killed, and many other Congolese wounded, before the situation was brought under control by 39 Bn.

At 39 Bn HQ Comdt D. HASSEY, 2IC Bn who was in Comd (Bn O/C was in DILOLO) put the Bn on a state of alert, and had Force 'Tranquilliser' committed as soon as the situation was clarified. This took some 30 minutes because of conflicting reports: a European who was present in the bar during the shooting, arrived at HQ with a false and misleading report as to what had happened, and where. As soon as 39 Bn patrols began to appear in town, the ANC withdrew to LE BRIDON, around which they continued to fire from defensive positions. Darkness had fallen when 2IC 39 Bn succeeded in locating Major VANGU and he, together with Police Chief MAGHOMA, and Mr. SANDBORN (UN Provincial Observer) - at his own request - was dispatched in a Swedish APC under Comdt C. KELLEHER, in an effort to get order re-established. An escort of an Inf Pl with Armd Car Sp under the Comd of Comdt E. YOUNG accompanied the APC. After some difficulty at LE BRIDON during which the APC was surrounded by some excited and hostile ANC, Major VANGU succeeded in proving his identity, and in regaining a measure of control over his soldiers.

As an immediate security measure Comdt HASSEY established strong points of UN personnel at both entrances to LE BRIDON, and had the ZILC I barrier manned as well. The object was to prevent movement of all Armed ANC through these points. Comdt HASSEY also secured from UMHK a villa beside Bn HQ in which a Stand-to party could be located, and be committed to action at very short notice; an arrangement which continued in force throughout the Bn's mission. Continual patrolling throughout the night, and during the succeeding days ensured against fresh outbreaks of savagery, and did much to prevent hysteria (with the probability of a large scale exodus) among European families.

The days which followed were charged with tension. UMHK European technicians held a protest meeting, and threatened strike action, in the absence of adequate safeguards for themselves and their families. UN was criticised by the hysterical for having allowed the outbreak of violence, and by the vindictive for having suppressed it without the shedding of ANC blood. The Chief of Police cried for justice, and demanded in vain that the case against the ANC be conducted by him, so that the culprits be brought to trial under the criminal code. 39 Bn HQ seethed with activity, and the problem of mediating between the ANC and its innumerable critics on the one hand; and in stretching its slender resources to meet the new security needs, on the other, imposed quite a strain. A succession of conferences, in which the different interest were represented were held, but did little to diminish tension.

Major VANGU was secretive about the result of his investigations; bluntly refused Police intervention into the case, and infuriated the first such Conference by attempting to dismiss the incident as a "petite chose" (a minor matter).

At the request of Gen Manager UMHK the Sector Comd gave a written undertaking that the 39 Bn would continue to man the barriers for 24 hrs a day for "as long as was necessary to ensure the safety of the Civilian population", and this apparently, helped in averting the threatened strike. Some days later however, this agreement became a matter of bitter contention between Gen Manager UMHK and OC 39 Bn. The manning of barriers for 24 hours a day had become an intolerable strain on the Bn; and with the combined effects of dispersion, and fatigue, calculated to impair operational efficiency, it was decided to confine the duration of barrier duty to a period from 0630 - 2330 hrs. UMHK at once protested that this was in breach of agreement, and that it was psychologically bad. (As it did not sufficiently repress and humiliate the ANC!). Support of the UN Provincial Observer was enlisted by UMHK, and this official appealed to Kat Comd for a direction to 39 Bn, to continue barrier duty for 24 hrs a day. After a sharp tussle at the higher HQ however, a decision in favour of 39 Bn was given.

By Sat 9th June when GOC Kat Comd, and Col BOBOSO (OIC 4th Groupment ANC) visited KOLWEZI there was little change in the general situation, but there was a slight reduction in tension. The Camp at LE BRIDON was visited, and those arrested by Major VANGU for their part in the shooting were paraded and questioned by Col BOBOSO, in the presence of GOC Kat Comd and O/C 39 Bn. This was the first real proof that arrests had in fact been made.

At a Conference which followed at Sector HQ, Col BOBOSO expressed indignation at the presence of UN strongpoints around LE BRIDON and demanded their immediate removal. His request was refused; but the ANC were accorded the face-saving compromise of having the ZILO I barrier mutually occupied by ANC and UN. Small as this concession was, it had the effect of improving relations between ANC and 39 Bn. But the main problem of diminishing hatred, fear and suspicion of the ANC in the minds of the civilian population remained.

The remainder of the month of June passed quietly, and the return of A Coy from DILLOLO on the 8th, and of Lt MULCAHY's Platoon (C Coy) from E'VILLE on the 6th eased the almost unbearable burden of duties on NCO's and men, and strengthened the Unit's operational capacity.

ENTER (AND EXIT) M. TSHOMBE

Mr. TSHOMBE arrived in KOLWEZI towards the end of May. His father-in-law, the Paramount Chief of the LUNDA tribe, was dying at KAPANGA, and the ex-President plied between KOLWEZI and KAPANGA for the period in which the Chief died and a successor was elected. When in the middle of June he desired to return to E'VILLE he deemed it advisable to seek UN protection; for in his absence his E'VILLE house had been raided by Central Government Security police (SURETE), and - according to the Press-documents incriminating him of continuing to maintain a private army were unearthed. The UN Political arm saw no good reason why it should assist the ex President in any way, and the requested escort was NOT forthcoming. For a few anxious days Mr. TSHOMBE stayed on in KOLWEZI, while one wondered if the Central Government would be so rash as to order his arrest in his own stronghold. Had this happened, local reaction would have been violent and spontaneous, and during these days the 39 Bn was kept in a state of readiness. Wisdom prevailed however, and although on 13th June one of his close associates (a Eurasian) was arrested near the Presidential residence in KOLWEZI, no move against Mr. TSHOMBE was made. He left in the small hours of the 14th June, and was in PARIS two days later.

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INDEPENDENCE DAY PRECAUTIONS

30 June was Congolese Independence Day, and the Katangese were to celebrate this event for the first time since 1960. As usual the prophets of Gloom predicted violence and bloodshed.

A system of intensive patrolling covering a radius of 50 miles from KOLWEZI was initiated about the middle of the month with the object of locating any concentrations of ex-Gendarmerie who might be organising a demonstration on Independence Day; or at least, - by showing UN activity, - of keeping them off balance. There was nothing in any patrol commander's report to suggest that a substantial concentration could be mustered anywhere in the locality. If a Gendarmerie organisation did in fact continue in force at this time, the secondary object of the patrolling system was achieved.

The only place in the immediate vicinity of KOLWEZI which would provide both a refuge and a base, for Ex-Gendarmerie was C.E.C. On Police Chief MAGHOMA's suggestion, it was decided that this should be "combed out" one week before Independence Day, with the object of picking up weapons, and checking the identity of all occupants. The operation required a cordon of troops - 39 Bn and ANC - along the 4 mile perimeter; and a number of parties of police to carry out a co-ordinated search.

On the morning of Sat 22nd Jan, plans were made and preliminary orders were issued at 1130. Sat afternoon was devoted to recce - with the minimum of ostentation - by Coy Comds; and final orders were issued at Bn HQ at 1900 hrs. The troops employed were:-

A Coy with under comd 2 pls ANC

B Coy " " " 1 pl ANC

Arm'd Car Gp

One pl of HQ Coy, under Capt L. O'CONNOR. The operation commenced, at 0300 hrs, and the cordon was in position as planned, at 0530 hrs, - one hour before first light.

The search by Police began at 0630 and continued for six hours. Very few weapons were found; but 133 arrests were made of people whose identification papers were NOT in order. These included men who were 'wanted' for having created a bloody riot two months previously at JADOTVILLE.

O/C and Ops 39 Bn were summoned to a Conference at Kat Comd, which ran throughout the afternoon of 24th and morning of 25th June. The proceedings were directed by the G2 who was also A/COS: a SCANDANAVIAN Major of vivid imagination, but little sense. The briefing which preceded discussion was characterised by distortion of facts, gross exaggeration of ex Gendarmerie capabilities, and a wildly sensational, pessimistic, and bloody forecast of the probable outcome. The 39 Bn representatives, though shaken, (but reassured by the outcome of Operation DILLO and satisfied with measures already taken at KOLWEZI), assured the Conference of their confidence in the ability of the Unit to handle any situation that might arise in their Sector, and were the only voices of optimism raised - Nor did they feel they had earned any accolade in being proved right. The Katangese may not have been politically sympathetic to the sentiments which inspired celebration on Sun 30 June, but they could see no good reason for not enjoying themselves on the holiday they were given on the following day. So they sang and danced; and the only liquid that flowed was Simba!

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ANC JULY DISORDERS

To avoid incident Major VANGU had confined his troops to Camp during Independence Celebrations. On the following Sunday he allowed them out to celebrate; which they did, - in their usual fashion. First indication of impending trouble came at about 1530 hrs in a telephone call to the Duty Offr, 39 Bn which reported that ANC and police were fighting in a bar in C.E.C. The Stand-to party (under Capt B. O'DONOVAN) was at once despatched, and found Capt PIBWE 2IC 8 Bn vigorously restoring the situation by clearing all ANC in C.E.C. back to Camp on 2 trucks. There were some damaged skulls among the rival groups, and one ANC Sgt was taken to Hospital for treatment. His injuries were NOT, in fact, serious.

All might have ended there, were it not for the fact that ANC Major MATEMI (ex Kat Gen) discovered that his car had been damaged, and his mistress insulted during the fracas. He left the scene uttering drunken threats of immediate vengeance on the police by the ANC. The rumour initiated by Major MATEMI, - or the equally irresponsible and drunken Capt KITCKO, - that the injured Sgt had died, spread like a bush fire throughout the 8 Bn; and for this sinister purpose its communication system worked better than it had ever done before, or subsequently. Reports of shooting at DEL COMMUNE and LE MARINEL followed in quick succession. Because of the UN guard near LE BRIDON nothing developed there; and there was only one incident reported from LE MARINEL. Shooting continued at DEL COMMUNE Camp, and the firing was apparently directed at the European occupied houses, which were within range of the Camp. A patrol of Armd Cars was sent to investigate. Firing ceased on the arrival of the patrol. The patrol Comds report indicated that the Camp was in a state of disorder and excitement, with no one in control. The Camp was also visited by Comdt E. YOUNG and Mr. SANDBORN, who called on Capt KITCKO, and found him donning his accoutrements of battle. Having uttered some gentle words of dissuasion, Comdt YOUNG and Mr. SANDBORN left, in the belief that the situation was in hand.

Throughout the afternoon and evening the 39 Bn was on a state of alert; patrolling was intensified and all check-points manned. Towards 2200 hrs it appeared that the crisis had passed, and an order to 'Stand down' the Unit was about to be issued, when a message was received from Lt COTTER that 2 truck loads of 60 armed ANC were attempting to force the ZILO I barrier, and get into KOLWEZI town.

Now it was clear that Major MATEMI's threat was not an idle one. But his design was frustrated by the steadfast attitude of Sgt N. O'BRIEN 'B' Coy (NCO i/c of Barrier Party of 3 men) and by offrs and men of the Armd Car Gp, who stood firm in the face of the drunken and excited rabble which menaced them. Lt COTTER's section of Armd Cars had been sent to reinforce the barrier, and these at once took up position, and turned their guns and search-lights on the Congolese soldiers. Capt B. O'DONOVAN's Stand-to party now arrived and were deployed to the rear of the barrier to protect Lt COTTER's cars and Sgt O'BRIEN's party. Three other armd cars on patrol in town under 2/Lt L. COCKE came up as additional reinforcements; and to provide against a wide flanking movement, B Coy were ordered to occupy positions in rear, in the area of the rond-point, on the outskirts of KOLWEZI. Capt KITCKO next arrived at the Barrier with the injured ANC Sgt, whom he had collected in KOLWEZI. The Capt adopted an outrageously aggressive attitude to the UN force, and demonstrated his contempt by kicking the barrells which formed the barrier. Fearing that this action would incite the ANC to violence, Lt COTTER attempted in vain to dissuade him; and was eventually constrained to order him into his car at gun point. Lt COCKE assisted in having Capt KITCKO removed from the scene. After this a short but tense confrontation, the ANC reversed their trucks around the nearest bend, and the 39 Bn Troops heard some of them move into the bush, - with the probable intention of outflanking the

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barrier and continuing their advance on Police HQrs cross country.

Lt COCKE was then sent forward with five Armcd Cars to locate the ANC and report their position. Since they were NOT met before DEL COMMUNE Camp was reached, Lt COCKE, acting on instructions, called on the ANC Orderly Officer, and obtained an assurance that the troops had returned. All was now quiet in Camp, and although the Orderly Officer was very drunk, there was some consolation in finding the Guard alert and sober.

Repeated and unsuccessful efforts to contact Major VANGU and Capt PIBWE (2IC 8 Bn) were made throughout the evening: in the hope that either one was sober, and capable of controlling the rabble. Sometime before midnight, O/C 39 Bn succeeded in conveying by phone to Major VANGU the seriousness of the situation. Within an hour Major VANGU rang back with an assurance that he had contacted all his posts, and that there was no further danger of unruly conduct. Extra precautions were taken, however, by 39 Bn HQrs, and patrolling of the ZILO I Barrier and of selected routes, was ordered from first light on Mon 8th July. At 0715 hrs an ANC jeep carrying Capt KITCKO approached the barrier at high speed, refused to slow down when signalled, and sped through, the sentry barely managing to jump clear. Lt COCKE's armcd car patrol was at hand in rear however, and Lt COCKE stepping on to the middle of the road, aimed his loaded Gustav at the driver, brining him to a halt a few yards in front of him. Capt KITCKO was a bit unlucky in the timing of his gestures of defiance! KOLWEZI was once more shocked and alarmed by the events of this day, which were known. But the citizens had to be left in ignorance of the attempt by the ANC to force the barrier; and they never realised the extent of their indebtedness to the men of the 39 Bn, who saved many of them from massacre.

UN HQrs reacted with speed and energy. A protest in unmistakeably strong language was at once addressed to the Central Govt; and Col LAGO LINQUIST COS Kat Comd, accompanied by a Staff Offr, the Belgian Vice Consul, and the Gen Manager of SOGELEC arrived at an early hour on Mon 8th Jul, for an on-the-spot investigation. Following an expose of the incident at 39 Bn HQ the party went to LE MARINEL, from which the Manager and technical staff had threatened to withdraw unless their security could be guaranteed.

One of their electrical Engineers had been returning from KOLWEZI to his home, with his wife and new-born infant, when the trouble broke out on Sun. As he approached the European Quarter at LE MARINEL some 3 or 4 ANC, rifles at the hip, had tried to stop him. He increased speed, and was at once fired on. A bullet through the rear screen passed between himself and his wife, grazing and leaving a red weal on his temple. The car with shattered screens, was produced for inspection, while he and his colleagues gathered around, and made excited and very unflattering comment on the ANC and the UN. Col LINQUIST called a Conference of all interested parties at 39 Bn HQ for 1000 hrs on Tues.

The conference was in fact an inquisition. Victims of the outrage were invited to state their complaints, and Major VANGU was given an opportunity of replying. He pleaded for confidence in his troops, and gave a personal assurance that there would be no recurrence. Any positive effect which might accrue from his plea, however, was shattered by his explanation of the shooting at DEL COMMUNE: the Europeans had been unnecessarily worried; the shots had NOT been directed at their houses, but at those occupied by some ANC officers; these officers had offended the troops by trying to prevent them from returning to KOLWEZI, to shoot the Police; the ANC had NO axe to grind with the Europeans! Gen Manager SOGELEC was asked if he was satisfied that Major VANGU's guarantee would be considered an adequate safeguard. His reply was - understandably - in the negative. COS thereupon

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ordered 39 Bn to occupy an outpost at LE MARINEL in Platoon strength. The post was opened by Lt J. MORTELL, 'A' Coy, on 9th Jul.

Two days later the occupation of DEL COMMUNE was ordered: Initial occupation was by Lt W. O'RIAN's Platoon also of 'A' Coy.

GEN MOBUTU's VISIT

On Sun 14th July Gen MOBUTU visited KOLWEZI, to enquire into the events of the previous Sunday. After a reception attended with usual pomp and circumstance, he repaired to the MANIKA Hotel, to hear complaints against his Army from whatever source they might be offered. By force of personality he somehow managed to stifle effective criticism; and having confessed to the imperfections of the 8 Bn, he outlined the handicaps under which they laboured during the past ~~two~~ years. He ended by bluntly telling the citizens of KOLWEZI how much their own hostile attitude to Central Govt Authority contributed to the general malaise, and left them somewhat chastened.

In private session the General was briefed by O/C 39 Bn on the full seriousness of the ANC transgressions, and on completion of a thorough inspection of ANC troops and installations he assembled the Bn offrs, strongly admonished them, and outlined their future policy and conduct. The most valuable contribution Gen MOBUTU made was in dismissing from the minds of the Officers that the 8 Bn was "on Operations", - a phrase commonly used by Col BOBOSO in the course of his homilies to troops on parade. Access to arms and ammunition was limited by him to a two hour training period each morning, after which weapons would be handed into stores. And to remedy the defects in discipline and control which had been revealed he promised (perhaps threatened!) that at the earliest opportunity he would have the Unit withdrawn to SHINKOLOBWE Camp for a 6 month period of intensive and uninterrupted training. He also undertook to have the families of the Unit brought from LULUABOURG at the earliest opportunity.

Prior to his departure on Mon morning the General again conferred with the Sector Comd and UN Civilian Observer (one Mr. JERKOVIC a Yugoslav who had just arrived to replace Mr. SANDBORN). General MOBUTU demanded that the UN troops be withdrawn from their post at LE BRIDON, as their presence was utterly demeaning to the lawful forces of the State. He outlined the remedial measures he had taken and requested that if the 8 Bn should be guilty of any further transgression he be immediately informed by the quickest possible means; and he would move personally and directly against the culprits. Agreement on these terms was reached on the spot. And for practical purposes this ended the "reign of terror" of the ANC in KOLWEZI.

It was expected that UMHK would react strongly to the removal of the barriers, but chastened by the General's sharp and pertinent rebuke, they accepted it without protest. The measure of General MOBUTU's prestige, was reflected with equal clarity in the new attitude of the 8 Bn ANC. Henceforth, they made a sincere effort at conciliation, and co-operation; and any subsequent failings manifested, were attributable rather to fundamental shortcomings in background, organisation, and training, than to deliberate malice or vindictiveness.

The Sureté

The Central Government had now established military control over the vital points in Sector D. About the middle of July it moved in the SURETE (State Security Police) in some strength, with the task of finding and arresting all subversive individuals or groups in the Sector. No trivial mission this! Initially the efforts of this arm were directed only against Congolese; and in this phase the 39 Bn (sometimes with

ANC support) was directed to protect them.

OPERATION RATISSAGE

The police were to co-operate in the task of search and arrest under Sureté direction and surveillance. Since the police (according to Sureté estimates) would inevitably give advance warning to the inhabitants of the village or cite to be searched, they could not be brought into the planning stages, but were ordered to have a certain number mustered at an appointed RV at a fixed time (usually 0300 hrs). Apart from this added complication the organisation and conduct of 'RATISSAGES' differed little from the 'combing out' of C.E.C. on 23 Jun (Page ____).

The expected lack of enthusiasm on the part of the police was at once manifested. Following a series of Operation Orders from KAT COMD, countermanded on each occasion, (because of second thoughts on the part of KAT COMD or Mr. ILEO,) it was finally decided that Operation RATISSAGE would be launched on 25 Jul on RUWE Cite. Arrangements with Sureté were made, orders were issued to 39th and 8th Bns; while the Chief of Police was warned of impending operation, (but NOT of location), and agreed to have requisite numbers of police on transport standing by. But on the afternoon of 24 Jul, he and his 'adjoint' managed to be out of town at the same time, and as neither could be contacted up to 2130 hrs, the Operation had to be called off. The Sureté lodged a vehement protest with Mr. ILEO at E'VILLE, and he in turn darkly hinted to GOC KAT COMD at connivance on the part of 39 Bn in the abortive affaire. It took some days to present the true picture of events; and although no action was taken against the Police, M. MAGHOMA appreciated that the gambit was not to be repeated, and no difficulties were experienced in mustering police for RATISSAGE Operations on succeeding days.

On the afternoon of 25 Jul Platoons of 'A' and 'C' Coys cordoned off the villages of KINGANGU and WALEMBA, in each of which the Sureté picked up small quantities of small arms, and primitive weapons. The same evening arrangements were made for a move on KAPATA on the 26th Jul.

This operation was significant because being the first RATISSAGE of a UMHK Cite, it was likely to provoke a sharp reaction among management and employees, which could have led to protest strike action. The Cite, some 10 miles from KOLWEZI, was quite extensive, required 2 Coys of 39 Bn and 4 Pls of ANC for an effective cordon. A and C Coys each with two pls of ANC under comd were detailed; the cordon to be in position by 0530 hrs. Having regard to difficulties of assembly, co-ordination, movement, language etc., the mission was carried out with surprising smoothness. Search was completed at 0800 hrs. Other results were quite negative: no weapons were found, and there was NO reaction from UMHK.

M. MAGHOMA now appeared to be a sudden convert to the principle of ratissage, for he requested that the village of MWANGESI be done on the way home from KAPATA: according to his intelligence MWANGESI was bristling with armed ex-Gendarmerie. Comdt MADDEN, OIC 'C' Coy was given the task, and had under comd a pl of ANC. There was no opportunity to make a preliminary recce, without warning the inhabitants; and since some cross country movement was essential, it appeared a well-nigh impossible task to co-ordinate movement of the different elements, so that troops would appear simultaneously along the entire perimeter of the village. Orders were issued on the roadside. The convoy of troops moved off while the Police and Sureté were held back until the cordon was established.

Once more the encirclement was carried out with remarkable speed and precision; and once more the search yielded absolutely nothing.

Part of the UMHK cité of MUSONOI was later treated, with an equally unproductive yield; and the Sûreté thereupon lost enthusiasm for this type of work, and turned their attentions on individual Europeans. In this they were more successful, but since the 39 Bn were NOT directly concerned, the details are omitted from this narrative.

Banditry

The month of Aug and the first week of Sep were - apart from a few thefts of UMHK trucks - periods of tranquillity in Sector D, although other areas of KATANGA did NOT enjoy the same good fortune. Around E'VILLE and on the main E'VILLE - KOLWEZI road, there was a disquieting increase in acts of banditry by small armed groups who held up cars, slaughtered and robbed the occupants, and drove away the captured vehicles. In this vast area the police were powerless to give protection to individuals, so a convoy system in which motorists could avail of armed civil police escort at fixed hours was organised.

KAT Comd also ordered a series of shuttle patrols between KOLWEZI and JADOTVILLE, on the basis of one patrol per week each by 39 Bn and the INDONESIAN Bn. Patrols of 39 Bn were in Section strength with arm car support, and involved an overnight stay in JADOTVILLE. Patrols were to make frequent halts, contact head men of villages along the route, and carry out small scale searches of the bush. This procedure was repeated on the return journey, and since the INDONESIANS were operating the same system to KOLWEZI and back, - on a schedule co-ordinated by BOTH Bn HQrs, - the route was patrolled four days each week. This was as formidable a deterrent as the slender resources of ONUC could then mount against the Bandits, and it achieved its object.

This operation was of value in several other ways: in providing an opportunity of training small teams in Inf-Cav co-operation; in giving junior leaders experience in control of sections; in bush patrolling, and in developing sense of responsibility and independence in the matter of administrative details and communication. It also gave the troops a change of work, and of scene, and an opportunity of closer association with the Indonesians.

LONG RANGE PATROLS, SECTOR 'D'

In order to retain the initiative within Sector D, and to improve training at Company level, plans were made for long range patrols each of 4 - 5 days duration by B and C Coys in Aug and Sep. Increasing transport difficulties, however, imposed modifications, and while "B" Coy succeeded in carrying out its part of the programme, it was found necessary to scale down C Coys effort to two overnight patrols in platoon strength. Conservation of remaining, and ever dwindling transport resources became a critical issue, with the withdrawal from ONUC of the 6 US APC's in the second week of August. The idea of mounting long range patrols at this late stage in the Bn mission was strongly opposed by the Bn Q element, who were now preoccupied with the gigantic task of evacuating a vast accumulation of stores, and closing accounts, - in the belief that 39 Bn was NOT being replaced. Without doubt a postponed withdrawal from operational activity increased considerably the problems of the QM and his staff, but the factors on the credit side outweighed the inherent administrative difficulties and it was therefore decided to go ahead with the patrol of 'B' Coy as planned.

The Coy with under Comd 1 Pl FNC and 1 Sec of Arm'd Cars set out on 22 Aug with the mission of establishing a base Camp at MUTSHATSHA, and from there organising system of patrols within a 30 mile radius; with the object of capturing Ex-KAT Gendarmerie, of locating arms dumps, or, - failing in these, - of at least providing a show of force in this remote territory. It was also, of course, an experiment in co-operation between

UN Forces and ANC at a low and therefore intimate level. The Coy carried out its patrol and search plan with energy and enthusiasm; and although no Ex-KAT Gens, or arms dumps were picked up, the exercise yielded many satisfactory though less tangible results, chiefly by way of increased self-confidence and morale in all ranks, and a better spirit of co-operation with the ANC. But the appalling road conditions of the area took its toll on the diminishing transport, and a repetition of the operation for C Coy was NOT feasible.

Instead in mid-Sep two patrols each of Platoon strength were sent out. The first under Lt J. CASEY on 17 Sep occupied a camp near SAKABINDA, a village which straddled the RHODESIAN border. On the following day Lt F. MUSHINY's platoon moved to MUSKATANDA, (20 miles SW KOLWEZI), having been compelled to postpone the mission for one day through transport difficulties. Both regions were alleged to be centres of Gendarmerie activity according to information received from A/O/C 8 Bn, Major MATEMI. In fact, these platoon patrols were scheduled to take place immediately after patrols of the ANC had occupied the same localities. (As part of the effort against the Kat 'Gens' in this area a ratissage had been carried out on MUSHIMA at first light on 31 Aug). The Platoons returned to the AIRPORT on 21 Sep.

Their purpose of the Platoon patrols was NOT the capture of Ex-Gendarmerie, who would obviously have adequate forewarning; but, by keeping them on the defensive, - of reducing their capacity to create mischief.

LUALABA "PROVINCETTE"

The remainder of the 39 Bn mission was devoted to maintenance (and restoration!) of peace in the tense and disorderly times associated with the inauguration of the President and Parliament of the new "provincette". The proceedings were directed by a special Commissaire of the Central Govt, Mr. Simon MALUNGA, who arrived with his Staff from LEOPOLVILLE about the middle of Aug, with the task of making all arrangements for setting up the new administration, in accordance with an ordinance of the LEO Govt. The general scheme was that deputies returned to the KATANGA Parliament, from the LUALABA area in 1960, would be assembled, and would elect a President, and a Council of Ministers.

The main parties concerned were the CENAKAT (pro-TSHOMBE) and the ATCAR. The latter were almost exclusively drawn from the TSHOKWE tribe, who were violently anti-TSHOMBE. Their candidate for the Presidency of LUALABA, one Mr. AMBROISE MAHUNGA arrived in KOLWEZI also about the middle of August, and set up office and home, near the Bridge in the centre of the town. Initially he had quite a modest entourage, but day after day the numbers continued to swell, - swarming in from all parts of KATANGA, but principally from the DILOLO area, which is the stronghold of the TSHOKWE tribe. These encamped in thousands in straw huts, (and in most unhygienic conditions), around the residence of their Leader, and awaited in patient expectancy, their share of the spoils of his acquisition of power. KOLWEZI's Civil Adm was alarmed by the menace, which this growing camp of squatters presented to health and security, and made urgent pleas to Mr. Simon MALUNGA to have the settlers dispersed. Obviously, however, the Special Commissaire was in no position to make such an order at this delicate stage; so the Commissaire de Districte took matters into his own hands, and ordered the local police to disperse the TSHOKWES by force. The TSHOKWE leader appealed for, and got ANC protection for his followers; and a dangerous confrontation of Police and ANC took place at the Squatters' Camp on the afternoon of 3 Sep. Fortunately, the Officers on both sides showed wisdom and restraint, and there was no violence. The TSHOKWES remained; the Commissaire de Districte was suspended from his high office, and placed in house arrest under ANC escort.

TSHOKWE RIOTS AT KOLWEZI

The tension thus created continued to mount during the succeeding weeks; flashpoint was reached when Parliament assembled on 23 Sep, and elected Mr. DIUR (CONAKAT) as President. There were immediate indications that the TSHOKWE reaction would be sudden and violent. Mr. Simon MALUNGA arrived at Bn HQ early in the afternoon, and requested UN protection. He claimed that the TSHOKWE's were about to attempt a coup d'état, and that they would probably have the support of the ANC. While planning to meet the situation was in progress, an unexpected but temporary solution was provided by the elements. A truly awesome, tropical storm which lasted until nightfall broke over KOLWEZI, and rendered movement even by the most extreme fanatic unthinkable. It gave 39 Bn a welcome respite, in which to prepare for the future.

On the morning of 24 Sep the TSHOKWES demonstrated in the streets, and were dispersed by a party under Lt O RIAIN, 'A' Coy. At 1300 Police Chief MAGHOMA arrived at Bn HQ, with the information that they had over-run, and disarmed his police guard at the Presidential residence, and were in full control of the surrounding area. Capt B. O'DONOVAN's Stand-to party was at once dispatched, and Force Tranquiliser was put on alert. But Capt O'DONOVAN's direct methods made further intervention unnecessary; for by bold assault the small Stand-to party overwhelmed the TSHOKWES, and in a matter of minutes, 23 of them, (of whom 15 were armed with loaded rifles) were captured, and the Residence retaken. Active patrolling throughout the remainder of the day prevented any further eruptions.

Information was received from UMHK, that on the morning of 25 Sep, the TSHOKWES would endeavour to paralyse the factories of LULIU and METAIKAT, by intimidating the workers. Capt O'DONOVAN's party - still on their 24 hour duty - were sent out at 0700 hrs to investigate, and found the information to be well founded: large parties of TSHOKWES had sealed off the road near the factories, making it impossible for the workers to report. Again the Stand-to party, acting with speed and vigour, arrested the whole group, (65 strong) and immediately had them lodged in a KOLWEZI prison. Mr. AMBROISE MAHUNGA arrived at Bn HQ to protest against this summary treatment, and accused the Bn of discriminating against him and his followers. But no sooner had he left than a series of disturbances in KOLWEZI were reported: the TSHOKWE's with support from ANC soldiers, were stopping cars and rough-handling Africans and Europeans. A car had been burned near the bridge, and an attempt made to prevent the driver from escaping from the blazing vehicle. A system of small inf-arm car mobile patrols was established in town, and two standing inf-cav patrols were mounted in the immediate vicinity of the TSHOKWE Camp. These measures continued throughout the day, and no further outbreaks of violence occurred. Late in the evening at a meeting convened by the Special Commissaire, the TSHOKWE leader, Mr. A. MAHUNGA, agreed to order his followers back to their villages.

Their evacuation to DILLOLO, under the benevolent supervision of Capt F. MULLOWNEY, took place by rail on the following day.

TSHOKWE RIOTS AT DILLOLO

The 39 Bn was NOT, however, quite finished with this stormy group. Their return to DILLOLO was marked by fresh outbreaks of violence there. Reports from President DIUR on 29 Sep indicated that DILLOLO was in a state of utter chaos: villages had been burned; the railway tracks torn up; a warehouse containing the complete cotton harvest set on fire; and, -

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most disquieting of all, - the ANC and the Police were in open conflict. Following an interchange of views between 39 Bn and COS KAT Comd it was agreed that it was incumbent on ONUC to restore order.

Two platoons of 'B' Coy, under Comdt E. YOUNG, were dispatched on the morning of 1 Oct; the remainder of the Coy was to follow on 2 Oct, on transport supplied by KAT Comd. Comdt YOUNG pressed forward at maximum speed, and by nightfall, was at KASAJI - some 3 - 4 hours from his objective, - when the mission was cancelled by HQ ONUC LEO. The reason for cancellation was later learned to be Gen MOBUTU's insistence, that the forces of the State be allowed settle the matter without outside interference. In fact, Capt PIBWE 2IC 8 Bn, and Police Chief MAGHOMA, who had left KOLWEZI shortly before Comdt YOUNG, succeeded in getting things under control in a few days. The patrol of 'B' Coy returned to KOLWEZI on the evening of 2 Oct, having travelled 350 miles over appalling roads.

On the same day, the advance party of 39 Bn left KOLWEZI Airport on repatriation. The Bn took special security measures for the installation of President DIUR on 6 Oct, but there were NO incidents. The remainder of Oct was devoted to packing for home.

The Bn was relieved by an Ethiopian Coy on 21 Oct, and, - apart from a small rear party - finally evacuated KOLWEZI on 26 Oct.

TRIBUTES:

The first formal sitting of the Parliament of LUALABA was held on OCT 5, in the presence of a large invited audience. The proceedings were opened by the Commissaire Speciale M. SIMON MALUNGA. In the course of his address, M. MALUNGA paid tribute in the efforts of the 39 Bn in the following terms:-

"I avail of this occasion to thank personally the Irish Troops under the Command of Lt-Col Dempsey, who in the course of my mission in KOLWEZI, have spared no effort to give the utmost support to the Representative of the Central Government in the maintenance of law and order".

During his visit to KOLWEZI on 11 OCT the Force Comd paid an Official call on the newly elected President D. DIUR, during which the President expressed his warmest admiration for the conduct of the men of the 39 Bn, and made an energetic plea for replacement by another IRISH unit, on the repatriation of the 39 Bn.

Text of the final message from Force Comd Gen KALDAGER to O/C 39 Bn:-

"On the eve of departure of 39 Bn from CONGO I wish to extend on my own behalf and that of ONUC HQ Staff our sincere and deep appreciation to you and your Bn for the successful operations which you have undertaken during the last six months. Your area of operations is recognised as one of the most sensitive parts of the CONGO, and the 39 Bn must be justifiably proud of its achievements, in an area which presented very complex problems. We have admired the ever ready co-operation, we have learned to expect, and always received, from your Bn. It is particularly gratifying to note, through your end and ours, that KOLWEZI and its environments have returned to normal conditions, and you can be assured that the excellent relations, which have been restored throughout the community of KOLWEZI, will remain a monument to the peaceful endeavours of the 39 Irish Bn.

By your achievements you have set a fine example for your successors. Personally I have learned to appreciate your own skilful, and commonsense

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approach, to the delicate problem of peace-keeping in SECTOR 'D'.
As your Bn leaves the CONGO may I express my deep gratitude for a
job well done, and bid you farewell with - Go n'eirigh an bhothair
libh".

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APPENDIX "A" to SECTION I
UNIT HISTORY, 39 BN

MIL OPS/3362/3
ET SABETHVILLE.

11 May 1963.

FROM: HQ KAT AREA

TO: CO SEC 'D' KOLWEZI
AIR BASE COMMANDER, E' VILLE.
DANISH TRANSPORT COY.

SUBJECT: OCCUPATION OF DILOLO.

1. One Company group of 39 Irish Bn will occupy Dilolo. Move from Kolwezi to start on 16 May.
2. Tasks:
 - a. Secure Dilolo airfield and make it fit for landing of DC3s.
 - b. Secure Dilolo town.
3. Company group will be prepared to remain at Dilolo for two weeks.
4. Commander Sec 'D' to maintain continuous wireless communication with Company Group during move and when at Dilolo.
5. Company Commander to obtain from local authorities information on availability of accommodation for JNC or UN troops. Report to this HQ soonest.
6. 16 trucks from Danish Transport Coy will be put at the disposal of Commander Sector 'D' in Kolwezi on 14 May.
7. Logistics Support:
 - a. Company group will take tents.
 - b. Company group will take 7 days dry rations and 2 days 'C' rations.
 - c. Company group will take fuel for 1,000 kms move.
 - d. Emergency supplies during move by helicopter from Kolwezi.
 - e. As soon as Dilolo airfield has been secured, supplies by air and rail/road.
8. As soon as Dilolo airfield has been secured by Company Group the Air Base Commander, Eville, will recce the condition of the airfield.

COL
Offg CO KAT AREA

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UNIT HISTORY - 39th INFANTRY BATTALION - ONUC

PART II: "A" ADMINISTRATION ASPECTS

Formation of Unit

Early in February, 1963, in accordance with the Government's decision to continue supplying troops to United Nations Forces in Congo, Army HQ ordered the organisation of the 39 Inf Bn.

Confirmation of Officer appointments in the Companies was received on 6th February, 1963. Notification of Bn HQ appointments was made during March, 1963.

Medical processing, Training, Range Practices and "A" & "Q" Adm details were completed during March and April.

On 8th April, 1963 His Excellency, The President of Ireland, received all Battalion Officers at his residence at Arús an Uachtaran.

On the 10th April, 1963 the Bn Adv Party ~~was~~ dispatched to the Congo.

On the 24th April, 1963 the Bn was formally established as a unit of Óglaigh na hÉireann.

On Friday, 26th April, 1963 the 39th Battalion was assembled together for the first time at Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin. The ceremonies on that day consisted of the presentation and blessing of the Bn Flag, a review of the complete Unit by An Taoiseach, Mr. Lemass, and a March Past. An Taoiseach took the Salute.

Chronology.

- 8 Apr 63 - Adv Bn HQ opened at Dún Mhic Aoidh, Dublin.
- 10 " 63 - Bn Adv Party moved to CONGO.
- 16 " 63 - Conc of Bn HQ and HQ Coy at DÚN MHIC AOIDH, DUBLIN.
- 22 " 63 - Conc of "A" Coy Gp at DÚN CATHAL BRUGH, DUBLIN.
- 24 " 63 - " " "B" " " " DÚN UÍ CHOILEÁIN, DUBLIN.
" " "C" " " " CTC.
- 24 " 63 - Bn activated.
- 29 " 63 - Airlift Main Body commenced from DUBLIN.
- 5 May 63 - Final elements arrived KZI.

'A', 'B', and 'C' Coys had already been concentrated for 4 - 5 weeks each in its own Comd area.

Organisation and Estabs

The unit comprised:

Bn HQ and HQ Coy,
Three Coy Gps and
One Armd C Gp.

Bn HQ and HQ Coy:	16 Offrs	-	61 NCO's	-	45 Ptes	:	122
Each Coy Gp	: 5 "	-	30 "	-	68 "	:	103
Armd C Gp	: 5 "	-	14 "	-	12 "	:	31
<u>TOTAL</u>	: 36 "	-	165 "	-	261 "	:	462 plus 2 chap- lains.

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Estab V Str

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>NCO's</u>	<u>Ptes</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Estab :	26	165	261	462
Str :	36	166	259	461

1 Cpl was repatriated on disciplinary grounds.

1 Coy Sgt " " medical grounds.

16% of Officers had previous overseas service.

45% of NCO's had previous overseas service and 30% of these had completed two previous tours.

60% of Ptes had previous overseas service and 25% of these had completed two previous tours.

Sub-Unit Derivation

A Coy Gp : Ceann O (less one R Pl) - CTC one R Pl.

B Coy Gp : Ceann P.

C Coy Gp : Ceann I (less one R Pl) - CTC one R Pl.

Armd C Gp : Cór Mar.

Bn HQ 7 HQ Coy : All-Army.

Normal Routine:

a. Reveille : 0630 hrs.

b. Mass : 0700 hrs.

c. Breakfast : 0745 hrs.

d. Parade and Office Duties; Training : 0800 hrs.

e. Lunch : 1300 hrs.

f. Rest Period 1330 - 1430 hrs.

g. Recreational Training, Sight-seeing Trips, Visits: 1430 hrs. 1700 hrs.

h. After-Duty Social Activities.

Duties

Security duties in the Battalion consisted of:

a. Static Guards at Posts and Outposts.

b. Post Patrols.

c. Company stand-to Parties.

d. Battalion Stand-to Party.

e. Battalion Special immediate-alert Force.

Post Guards

Airfield	:	1 Offr, 1 NCO and 4 Ptes	:	24 hr Guard
Camp Ruwe	:	1 Offr, 1 NCO and 6 Ptes	:	ditto
Lualaba Outpost	:	1 NCO and 3 Ptes	:	Night Guard

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Le Marinel Outpost : 1 NCO and 3 Ptes
 Del Commune " : ditto

Post Patrols

Camp Ruwe : 1 NCO and 2 Ptes : By night.
 Airfield : ditto : "
 Bn HQ Area : 1 NCO and 4 Ptes : "

Company Stand-to Parties

Each Company had one Pl at $\frac{1}{2}$ hrs notice at all times.

Battalion Stand-to Party

Located at Bn HQ consisted of one Pl plus one detachment 84 mm Atk. This party was mounted on two Swedish APC's and was on a 24 hr tour of duty.

Battalion Special immediate - alert Force

See reference to "Force Tranquilliser" in the Narrative.

The incidence of duty was particularly heavy on all ranks in the Battalion because of the necessity to maintain stand-to and immediate-alert forces in addition to static guards at posts. Further aspects on this subject are also dealt with under operational matters.

Ceremonial Affairs

a. Visits

- 20 May -. Mr. Mathu Chief Offr Katanga UN Brandt Chl Bheerius COS KAT COMR visited unit at DILLO and were provided with a Guard of Honour.
- 28 May - Col Boboso ANC OC Command and the Sec of State to Congolese Defence Ministry visited ANC troops and were provided with a Guard of Honour.
- 31 May - Maj-Gen Kobbede Guebre Force Comdr visited unit and was provided with a Guard of Honour.
- 8 June - Col A. Worku GOC KAT COMD and Col Boboso ANC visited unit and were provided with a Guard of Honour.
- 14 June - Mr Dorsinville Chief UN Offr ONUC and Col Worku visited unit and were provided with a Guard of Honour.
- 20 June - Mr Wilson British Consul Elizabethville and Mr. Martin British Embassy Leopoldville visited BN OC.
- 8 July - Col R. Lago - Lenquist COS KAT COM and Mr. Humblet Belgian Vice-Consul Elizabethville visited unit and were provided with a Guard of Honour.
- 14 July - Gen Mobutu, C in C ANC, visited KOLWEZI. Bn took part in representative parade and march-past.
- 17 July - Mr. Erskine B. Childers visited Bn OC.
- 24 July - US Military Attache Leopoldville visited Bn OC.
- 6 Aug - President Kasavubu visited Kolwezi with Mr. Ileo and Gen Mobutu. A Captains Guard of Honour was provided. The Armoured Car Group, equipped with every serviceable AFV and APC in the unit, represented the Battalion at a special ceremonial parade and march-past. By special request an armed escort was furnished by the Battalion to the presidential party on its return journey to Jadotville.
- 23 Sept - British and US Consuls, Elizabethville, visited Bn OC.

- 5 Oct - British and US Consuls, Elizabethville, visited Bn OC.
- 12 Oct - Maj-Gen A. Kaldager, Force Commander, visited unit for presentation of Congo Service Medals. A Guard of Honour was provided.

b. Special Parades were also held as follows:

Ascension

- Day - Ceremonial Church Parade to Santa Barbara Church, Kolwezi. Altar Guard and Colour Party provided.
- 14 July - Similar ceremonial for Solemn Votive Mass of Blessed Oliver Plunkett.
- 15 Aug - Similar ceremonial in conjunction with 8 Bn ANC.
- 13 Oct - Similar ceremonial, also in conjunction with 8 Bn ANC, to commemorate the Invocation of Our Lady Queen of the Most Holy Rosary as Patroness of the Defence Forces.

- c. Functions. On each of the occasions listed above a suitable reception or Mess Dinner was arranged. In addition a Battalion Farewell Function was held on 12th Oct to which were invited representatives of State, Local Government, Industrial, Commercial, ANC and local officials of Congolese and European communities of Kolwezi.

Morale and Discipline.

The Morale of the Battalion was excellent throughout the tour. The individual standard of dress, bearing and punctilious saluting improved noticeably throughout the period. The unreliability of the mail delivery and dispatch service periodically had an adverse affect on morale. A further source of difficulty arose in the refusal of the ONUC Civilian Administration to pay ancillary allowances, to repatriate personnel savings (already collected) after 1st Aug, and to issue PX items already on order and paid for. While civilian administration could possibly justify these stringent financial restrictions, the resultant affect on the morale of a unit was either unknown or ignored. On the 4th July volunteers were called for to extend their current period of 6 months service with the Battalion until the end of the year. 24 Oftrs, 62 NCO's and 158 Ptes volunteered to extend-representing over 50% of the Battalion.

A due share in the credit for the state of high morale in the Battalion may be given to the Chaplains - Fr. C. Matthews C.F. and Fr. R. Neville, C.F., who worked tirelessly to provide the maximum spiritual facilities for all ranks and the response to their efforts was gratifying.

The Discipline of the Battalion was very good. Initially strong measures, including the repatriation of one Cpl of the advance party, were enforced to set the required standard and, as a result, no particular difficulties arose at any later stage.

Breaches of Discipline in Statistical Form

A.W.O.L.	-	32
Drunkness	-	7
Drunk on Duty	-	6
Out of Bounds	-	26
Insurbordination	-	3
Threatening Language	-	2
Disobeying Lawful Order-		9
Creating Disturbance	-	4
Striking Comrade Soldier		2

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Losing by Neglect	5
Improper Possession	4
Larceny	1
Making False Statement	2
Others	44
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>147</u>

"A" Administration - Difficulties

Some difficulties arose in "A" Administration with regard to shortage of staff, shortage of stationery, and language problems. The shortage of typists for the orderly room was acute and was only offset by the excellent work performed by the Orderly Room Sergeant, Sergeant Healy, who in addition to his normal duties also had to type all orderly room correspondence. The shortage of stationery was keenly felt in the last six weeks of the battalions tour as only a meagre supply became available from UN sources. The language problem arose in endeavouring to communicate with the local European community whose knowledge of English, was in many cases poor. The UN interpreters did not speak French. The services of the intelligence NCO, Cpl McCAFFERTY, who acted as interpreter was much valued on the occasions when he could be made available to "A" Administration.

Military Police

Always first in and last out - the police section of the 39th Battalion were NOT alone the eyes and ears of the battalion, but also its special recce group. On the first report of trouble, this section, under Capt J. DEVEREAUX and CS CASHMAN, was dispatched to ascertain the truth or falsehood of reports received. That they always moved out without question - NOT waiting either stand-to party or armoured cars, is attributed to their fearless spirit, and, indeed, many disturbances were dealt with by this group on occasions, when delay would have allowed situations to develop into more serious events. This small section provided constant and regular patrols and yet in discipline, dress and devotion to duty, they were exemplary, and a credit to the Military Police Corps. While, indeed, all were excellent, Sgt WILSON was particularly attentive to duty, and most efficient in a determined, quiet manner.

Medical Service.

The prevention of disease was in NO small measure due to the combined efforts of Comdt McSULLIVAN and Comdt CONNOLE, particularly in so far as Camp RUWE was concerned. Comdt McSULLIVAN awoke a sense of hygiene, which certainly showed results. His constant supervision of cookhouses and cook house staffs - black and white, with his frequent admonitions, was a welcome benefit to the Quartermaster. His constant and sustained interest in the genuine sick was an important factor in maintaining unit morale at a high level.

Medical Report

Climatic Condition

The Battalion tour was from mid-April to the end of October 1963. This period included 4 months of the dry season in KATANGA. The increased sun temperature and altitude with a low humidity were the main climatic features. Acclimatisation had to be attained gradually and some of the older group were subjected to cardio-respiratory strain which they successfully overcame. The

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necessity for adequate rest periods was borne out. The lack of rain created a problem with dust and sand which had become finely powdered and gave rise to irritation of the upper respiratory passages and conjunctivae. It was not possible to procure sufficient hose piping to keep the dust watered in camps. Patrols in some cases wore cloth masks on the roads. It is believed that the majority of cases of faucial inflammation were due to this source of irritation. A solution would be (a) a sufficient supply of piping (rubber or plastic) to keep the dust damped down in Camps, (b) for patrols, provision of masks similar to the smog masks to be worn by members on road patrols.

Salt Loss

This did not present a problem and personnel engaged in strenuous sports had no severe after-effects.

Some of the older members, who from time to time complained of lethargy and muscle pains, improved dramatically with administration of a salt dosage of 45 grms a day.

Mosquitoes. Flies and other vectors of disease did not present a problem and were readily controlled.

Standard of Fitness

The standard of medical fitness was very good. A number of NCOs and men over 50 years, about 5 to 6 in all, were included in the unit. These stood up well but had to receive constant watching. Two of these were hospitalised - one for appendicitis and the second for pneumonia. Nearly all personnel over 45 were examined after 3 months for cardio-respiratory assessment. There was a tendency among the older age group to become too inactive and put on weight - they did not take part in recreational facilities which suited the younger and more active types. These older members were in some cases more prone to spend the long evenings and nights in the canteens and messes.

Statistical survey incidence of disease

The figures cover the full period:-

Reported for Medical attention	:	313
Excused duty	:	154
Awarded Light duty	:	60

The number awarded excused-duty represents about 50% of the total - this reflected a high standard of morale.

Reported for Prophylactic Treatment	28
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Hospitalisation

The Unit was served by United Nations Hospital, Elizabethville, staffed by an Italian Red Cross team.

In addition the Bn MO operated a medical rest centre at Bn HQ and was able to look after certain cases which did not warrant full hospitalisation.

Patients treated UNO Hospital	:	13
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Hypertension	-	1
Pneumonitis	-	1
Appendicitis	-	2
Epithelioma Lip	-	1
Infectious		
Mononucleosis	-	1

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Torn knee ligaments	-	1
Fracture Tibia & Fib	-	1
Peptic Ulceration	-	1
Otitis Externa	-	1
Koenigs Syndrome	-	1
Unexplained Pyrexia	-	1
Aortic Stenosis	-	1

Patients treated Medical Centre, Battalion HQ, Kolwezi : 36

Depressive Psychosis	-	3
Lacerated Head Wound	-	1
Alveolar Abscess	-	2
Acute Gastritis	-	3
Inguinal Hernia	-	1
Herpes Zoster	-	3
Prolapsed I.V. Disc	-	2
G.S. Wound Hand	-	1
Prolapsed Haemorrhoids	-	1
Follicular Tonsillitis	-	5
Scarlet Fever	-	1
Fracture Tibia & Fibula-		1
Bronchiolitis	-	1
Spasm of Colon	-	1
Labile Hypertension	-	1
Frontal Sinusitis	-	2
Haematemesis	-	2
Furunculosis	-	1
Intestinal Haemorrhage	-	1
Gastroenteritis	-	1
Web Space Infection Hand-		1
Unexplained Pyrexia	-	1

Repatriated to Ireland - 1

Epithelioma Lip requiring high voltage therapy.

The sickness rate for the unit calculated per 1,000 was at the rate of 112 for the period of duty in the Congo.

The incidence rate calculated on the same basis for other UN contingents varied between 76 and 317 on average. The lower figure was applicable to a unit of small strength, less than 50 personnel. Comparing our figures of 112 with corresponding units of strengths greater than 250, we had the lowest figure on the tables.

The average rate of ineffectivity was 6 - 8 days for patients treated at Medical Centre Kolwezi.

The average rate of ineffectivity was 20.9 days for patients treated at U.N.O. Hospital, Elizabethville.

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Enterocolitis did not present any problem and nothing resembling Malaria or other tropical conditions was encountered.

Water supplies and sanitation were good and a high standard of camp and barrack sanitation was attained.

Food was received in good condition and was well cooked and the menu varied. The cooking staff did a very good job, this despite a constant strain on personnel due to the over-all inadequacy of cooks in the unit. The operating of petrol cookers imposed an extra strain on cooks due to the intense heat radiated in and around the cookers. The substitution of gas operated cookers would alleviate this latter problem and some other contingents in the Congo operation operated these gas cookers.

Drugs and Medical Supplies.

This unit was on the last of the drugs supplied from home. Some anti-biotic preparations had passed the expiring date and were still in use. A full survey of the medicines held was carried out and a large amount of body fluids - saline and plasma was packed and sent home with other surplus battalion supplies. A sufficient supply was held to meet emergencies but the excess quantities of saline and plasma reduced the operational mobility of the medical platoon. Some other preparations such as Parentrovite had become unserviceable due to precipitation and had to be disposed of by Medical Board.

Medicines were supplied from UN Medical Stores and were on a scheduled list - nothing outside this list could be supplied except with great difficulty. This scheduled list does not compare with our own accustomed usage and it will not be possible to supply freely the more expensive lines in the future - this applies to the variety of anti-biotics and steroid preparations which were made available from our own base stores. There were the odd few cases which required some preparation outside even our national list and the Bn MO was able to purchase locally as the occasion arose.

We were fortunate in being in close touch and having good relations with the Medical Staff of Union Miniere in Kolwezi, who offered the services of the hospital facilities operated by them in case of necessity but the occasion did not arise to avail of their offer.

Medical Assistance to Other Contingents and Congolese

Treatment was afforded to any UN personnel who required attention. These cases comprised mainly the civilian staff and the operatives at the Airport Kolwezi. Congolese employees and some members of the A.N.C. came for treatment and were looked after. There were no refugee camps in our sector of operation and other Congolese were able to avail of the local government medical services.

The battalion supplied escorts to the Union Miniere Hygiene team for about 3 to 4 weeks for 4 days each week during the annual disinfection programme of the native villages surrounding the township of Kolwezi. Bn MO accompanied the Medical Director of the Hygiene Institute on a number of his inspections on this programme. We had the services of Mr. Thomas HARNETT, Hygiene Officer seconded to UN by W.H.O. on these operations. Mr. HARNETT maintained very good liaison between our unit and U.M.H.K. Hygiene section. His appointment bridged the gap in our establishment occasioned by the absence of a hygiene squad.

Fatal Casualties.

No fatal casualty occurred to any of the Battalion personnel during the tour of duty. Comdt M. McMAHON, initially posted to the unit as Legal Officer, was transferred to HQ ONUC in June. He died in Leopoldville on the 28th Sept 1964 and all ranks of the Battalion mourned the loss of a former comrade and a highly esteemed and popular officer, R.I.P.

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Recreational Training

Recreational Training was planned in detail. All forms of Sport were organised and a complete series of Battalion Championships were played. Inter-Platoon Competitions took place in each Coy and the Bn Championships, Inter-Coy, were played in:

- a. Football : Winners - B Coy
- b. Soccer : " - HQ "
- c. Basketball : " - B "
- d. Tug-o'-War : " - B "
- e. Swimming : " - B "
- f. Athletics : M&T prizes won by B Coy. (Lt W. EGAR was the outstanding Athlete of the Bn).

The Bn Final in Soccer was decided only after extra time in second replay. There were four (4) swimming galas held. In addition to these activities two demonstrations of Gaelic Football were given and a Battalion Team played Soccer in the league organised by Katanga Command in which four matches were played.

All employed personnel were catered for and made avail of Recreational Training.

Three Athletic Meetings were held, one in Ruwe, one in Kolwezi Airport and a Bn Sports at Ruwe. Each meeting was a great success. A Bn Team of Runners took part in a 8 km Road Race against ANC, Congolese and Whites. The teams performance was considered very satisfactory.

The enormous success of the Recreational training plans was directly attributable to the energy, keenness and enthusiasm of the troops. This was displayed by the fact that two basketball pitches, three volley ball pitches, one sportsfield and a running track were prepared and made in the different posts.

Living Conditions

Generally accommodation in the three main posts was good but each one gave difficulties.

- a. Bn HQ and HQ Coy were in a large building which had been built as flats. The building was NOT in good condition. Practically all glass had been broken and glass doors were very dangerous. The floors, stairs and doors were all damaged.

The HQ Coy was slightly crowded, canteen facilities were poor. Eventually, on receipt of canvas, dining took place in two tents. The fact that it was the dry season and that water and light were available made it bearable. This was, in fact, the building which had been used to accommodate the Irish prisoners from Jadotville in 1961.

- b. In the airport all buildings had been destroyed or damaged. The troops lived under canvas which was NOT in good condition. Water had to be drawn from Kolwezi, 4 miles away. Light was from an engine which regularly gave trouble. Toilet facilities did NOT exist so field installations were constructed.
- c. Baths and showers were improvised by the unit in occupation. Special attention by the MO to field hygiene and sanitation was essential. Full use was made of Ruwe swimming pool.
- d. Camp Ruwe was a Condamne camp. Troops lived in huts. Accommodation was generally good. Water and light were available. Cooking facilities were inadequate and the Hydra cookers were continually in use.

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- e. In E'ville, Del Commune and Le Marinel houses and furnishings were taken over and troops had all modern conveniences including the use of swimming pools and recreation halls.
- f. The post at Lualaba Br which was only occupied for a short time suffered from the same disadvantages as the Airport.

Social Activities

By day, due to Recreational training, this was limited to sightseeing tours and visits, to Lualaba, Nzilo 1 and Nzilo 3, Mines, the Brewery, and some visits to Jadotville and E'ville.

The organisation of social activities at night was controlled and well done. This was considered most essential and was organised as follows:

- a. A minimum of two films each week in each post.
- b. One night of Bingo in each post.
- c. Inter-coy and inter-mess ring and dart competitions. There were three mens' Messes and Rec Halls and three NCOs Messes, all within 7 miles of each other so that on a minimum of one night per week there was a competition. In addition special matches were arranged with local teams.
- d. Concerts were held, including a Bn concert which was excellent.
- e. A Choir was organised and in each post a choir recital was held on at least one occasion each week.
- f. Social visits to Europeans by NCOs and men were kept to a minimum and the special passes required could be issued only by the Bn OC.
- g. Each officers' mess arranged a cocktail party and dinner and Bn HQ Mess organised two CO's dinners.
- h. Officers, in addition, had facilities to play tennis or golf by day light.

This ensured that in each post each night there was an activity whereby the troops were occupied, happy and a very keen sense of rivalry was evident. Its success is also reflected in the very small incidence of sickness and crime in the Bn during the period.

Canteen Facilities

Were adequate. Each Coy had a very good canteen at which all the normal items were available in sufficient quantities. In addition a good many semi-attractive items were available e.g. towels, sunglasses, swimming trunks and films.

An arbitrary decision by Chief Adm Offr ONUC to stop all canteen supplies was conveyed to the Bn in July. The grounds were, alleged over-spending.

The issue was skillfully and energetically contested, by Comdt M.N. GILL and Capt L. O'CONNOR, who after prolonged and patient negotiation, - involving two trips to LEOPOLDVILLE, - succeeded in obtaining most of the concessions to which the Bn believed itself entitled

"EXTERNAL RELATIONS"

Europeans:

While there was no open hostility shown by Europeans to the Bn, many took no pains to conceal their resentment of the policy and actions of ONUC in the KATANGA affaire.

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In general the attitude of the higher echelon of UMHK was one of cold, formal detachment; but individual members were friendly and hospitable, as were most of those with commercial interests in KOLWEZI (e.g. SIMBA, ELEKAT, BCK, the BAKERY etc.); with these many friendships were made, by a number of Bn personnel. UMHK being an autocratic body, accustomed to unlimited control, would gladly, if allowed, have dictated Bn policy. On the other hand it was most co-operative in many respects, even where NO self interest was involved, as for example in offering gratuitous medical services for special cases; and in facilitating the QM in various ways during the preparation for departure for home. Membership of the Golf and Bridge Clubs was open to Officers, but not that of the Swimming Club: an indication that policy was not directed, but was at the discretion of the various Committees.

Civil Adm:

Commissaire de Districts and his staff were co-operative and friendly on the few occasions when it was necessary to deal with them.

Police:

GOOD liaison with Commissaire on Chef MAGHOMA and his staff was maintained by Capt DEVEFEAUX and C/S CASHMAN MPC. The civil police Officers and men maintained a friendly and co-operative relationship with the Bn throughout its mission, mainly because of the fine example set by M. MAGHOMA, who was an outstanding character.

Native population:

Friendly relations were established where possible with the local tribal chiefs. The native population of the 'cities' around KOLWEZI were undemonstrative and indifferent. On the other hand those in the DILLOLO area gave the IRISH troops a warm and enthusiastic welcome. The difference in approach no doubt had its roots in political attitudes.

ANC:

As the narrative shows, relationships with the ANC fluctuated with events. In the final stages of the mission the ANC officers did their best to conform to the standards laid down by Gen MOBUTU. Major VANGU OC 8 Bn came frequently to 39 Bn HQ for consultation and advice. During the 5 day mixed patrol to MUTSHATSHA the men of 'B' Coy got on well with the ANC despite language difficulties. Mutual participation in Church Parades did much to improve relations.

Clergy:

The Bn Chaplains had a friendly relationship with the members of the religious orders - Franciscan and Salesian - around KOLWEZI. Rev. Pere PASCAL, OFM, P.P. was a man of quite exceptional character and personality, who facilitated the Bn by every means at his disposal.

Other UN Contingents:

Because of its isolated position the Unit had little contact with other contingents. Patrols brought a small scale association with the Indonesians, and a little was seen of the Swedish Bn at KAMINA. Apart from these, and visits by Comds and Staff Offrs of many nationalities, there was NO association.

Termination of Tour of Duty

On the 21st October, 1963 one company of Ethiopian Troops arrived in Kolwezi to take over duties from the 39th Battalion. The Battalion remained operational until 24th Oct when the Ethiopian Coy assumed operational responsibility for Kolwezi Town only.

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39th Bn set up its own transit camp in Elizabethville from which the Air Lift home was operated. The first troops left Kolwezi by road on 23rd October. The Air Lift commenced on 24th Oct. The final elements arrived in DUBLIN AIRPORT on SUNDAY, 27th OCTOBER.

Personnel of the Battalion were disbanded on 4th December, 1963 and posted to their home units.

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UNIT HISTORY - 39th INFANTRY BATTALION

PART III: "Q" ADMINISTRATION ASPECTS

Stores

While the initial work of the Q branch, 39 Battalion, began at McKEE BKS, with the opening of accounts, etc., the Branch did NOT function as a section until after the main body had arrived at ELIZABETHVILLE. Prior to the arrival of the main body, however, the take-over of stores from the 38 Battalion was completed. Those stores, apart from the requirements of the 39 Battalion, involved some three to four hundred tons of stores which had accumulated from previous Irish contingents and with which the 38 Battalion had been unable to deal, due to their involvement in action. The stores included:-

- a. Surplus NATIONAL stores.
- b. Surplus UN stores.
- c. Captured arms, ammunition, explosives and equipment.

The stocks handed over to the battalion were located at three main points:-

- a. LEOPOLD FARM, ELIZABETHVILLE;
- b. KOLWEZI;
- c. Camp RUWE.

With some minor stores in possession of the Swedish battalion at KAMINA.

Due to the low strength of the battalion and due to its commitments at KOLWEZI, it was NOT possible to allot anything like the numbers which would normally have been available to assist the Q Branch in their task of dealing with the accumulated stores. One platoon, under Lt MULCAHY, was made available as rear party at ELIZABETHVILLE, and with this platoon, supervised by the Battalion Engineer and Ordnance officers, aided by Coy Sgt CARROLL and Sgt CASEY, was accomplished a task which in administration has had few equals.

Firstly, all possible checking of stores was carried out, to ascertain the exact quantities and condition of those involved. It was found that the accumulation which had built up was far in excess of the requirements of the 39 Battalion and included vast quantities of equipment and stores which were unserviceable. Every round of SA ammunition, every grenade, every weapon and every item of equipment was checked, together with all items of both National and UN issue which were held. This check which would normally take months was accomplished in some five weeks, despite the fact that at the same time:-

- a. LEOPOLD FARM was being evacuated and all stores retained were being forwarded to KOLWEZI.
- b. Surplus UN stocks were being returned to the Base Salvage Depot.
- c. Captured arms, equipment and explosives were being examined, listed and returned from both Camp RUWE and LEOPOLD FARM to Salvage Depot.
- d. The Insurvey was in course of preparation.

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- e. Evacuated villas were being handed over to UN accommodation officer. (In this matter Comdt CONNOLE's persistence achieved wonderful results as the UN Civstaff were anxious to defer the transaction).

Despite the variety of the tasks in hand, the lack of transport and at times the lack of co-operation of Base Store personnel, the Q staff, through the enthusiastic co-operation of ordnance, engineer and C Coy platoon personnel, did achieve a remarkable result. By the time the Insurvey was completed, in approximately six weeks, the battalion has rid itself of much of its surplus UN stores - such as were serviceable, had handed in the captured arms, ammunition and equipment and already was preparing for the three-monthly Board of Condemnation.

The movement of stores to KOLWEZI was, in itself, a remarkable achievement in that over 200 tons were forwarded between road and air. This entailed long hours of tedious loading and checking, seven days a week on some occasions and despite the fact that normal guards were maintained at LEOPOID FARM, the morale of the platoon allotted to the security of the FARM, and to the provision of loading details, never faltered. This was in no small measure due to the interest of platoon commander Lt MULCAHY in his platoon, aided by Sgt KELLY (AN COL MIL) who provided the good humour.

The completing of the Insurvey was, in itself, an achievement in that over 3,500 items were involved and with UN procedure, this entailed a considerable quantity of typing, for which the Q staff did NOT have even one typist. This survey was partially successful in conditioning items so that they were acceptable into Base Salvage Depot. Immediately it was completed, however, preparations for the three monthly Board of Condemnation were begun. This Board was held on time and it proved most successful and cleared the battalion of much of the unwanted administrative tail. The Board involved some 3,000 ledger headings and was stated by the Logistics Inspection Team to have been an all-high record in UN, despite the fact that the unit was of reduced strength and had NOT been involved in any major action. Final approval of this Condemnation Board was given, only after it had been accepted that the stores boarded were the accumulation from previous contingents. It deserves mention here, that every item submitted for condemnation was, prior to submission, thoroughly examined, listed and prepared for survey. 99% of this preparatory work was done by the Ordnance team, comprised of Comdt WALSH, CQMS CARROLL and Sgt CASEY - a combination of whom any Q Staff could be proud.

Before completion of the Board of Condemnation, the preparatory work for repatriation of stores was undertaken. At this time it was understood that the 39 Battalion were to be the 'final' battalion and would be responsible for the repatriation of all National stores. As the packing materials and cases which had originally contained stores coming from Ireland had long since been 'repatriated' or unserviceable, the problem of securing replacements arose. Logistics HQ insisted that we should use the cases in which National stores had come from Ireland and delayed our packing by refusing us replacements. Eventually, cases were obtained, on payment by UN from UNION MINIERE. While the UN allotment was insufficient, we received the maximum co-operation from the mining company, who supplied NOT alone cases and crates in excess of those authorised, but helped out with steel binding tape and machines also. Both machines and tape were later received from UN, at a stage when 70% of the packing had been completed.

Once again, it was an Ordnance-Engineer team which, assisted by men from the companies, carried out most of this task. Packing also took place in the companies but the bulk of some 75 tons was packed under supervision of Comdt WALSH, Coy Sgt CARROLL and Sgt CASEY. When NOT engaged on tasks of their own type, or when NOT packing their own considerable quantity of equipment, the Engineer Section gave valuable assistance in the provision and adjustment of cases, ~~crates~~, etc. Every item was packed, listed on a packing slip, and so accurate was the work, that on the final check at

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CLANCY BKS, the battalion had practically an all clear ledger, other than some twelve items - all of which were already noted as deficient and for which documentary justification was produced. If it appears that much mention is being made of stores, condemnation, survey and repatriation, this is because it can be accepted as a major achievement to have taken over such a large quantity of stores - in such poor condition - to have dealt with them in accordance with UN regulations and procedures, to have repatriated all but a small quantity left behind as the requirements for the 2nd Infantry Group, and yet to have fully satisfied our Department of Defence and UN Logistics Branch.

Food

Food initially presented a problem. On arrival, it was found that rations were forwarded from ELIZABETHVILLE to KOLWEZI. A food store was maintained at LEOJID FARM and supplies were forwarded from there mainly by air. Initially, the 39th Battalion followed this practice. However, it proved to be rather an unreliable system, particularly with fresh rations, meat, etc. Firstly, there were difficulties due to the unreliability of air craft and after a few weeks due to the scaling out of air support, demands on aircraft were in excess of availabilities. Road transport was then utilised but was unsatisfactory, particularly for meat. After considerable pressure - and some sharp exchanges - Operation DILOLO being in full swing - permission was eventually granted for the hiring of fridge accommodation at ELEKAT in KOLWEZI. This proved a boon in that eventually we organised supply by fridge wagon - 16 to 25 ton at the time - with occasional road delivery of fresh vegetables. It is well to mention here that prior to the fridge accommodation being available, supplies though late, never failed, mainly due to the perseverance of 'our man in E'VILLE' - CQMS KELLY an (Ordnance) NCO, with NO previous experience of ration accountancy, but enthusiastic and determined to the extreme and to whom the rank or appointment of obstacle creators were of little consequence until he 'delivered the goods'. It is interesting to note that the ration account - prepared by CQMS KELLY and checked by UN Logistics Branch, were the subject of a complimentary observation which reached us after repatriation.

Mention of food, in the 39 Battalion, brings to mind that the battalion had the ideal Cook Sergeant - Sgt LOFTUS - Cook, Cookhouse supervisor, Ration Store NCO, even catering advisor to the Officers' Mess and almost always in good humour. His allotment of pack rations and his methods of utilising them without any hardship or damage to morale is much to his credit. His gift of condemned tins of pork and beans to his black workers - to observe effects - (mercifully they did NOT have any adverse effects), are indicative of his 'waste not' attitude.

It is to Sgt LOFTUS's credit that, despite the unreliability of aircraft both from E'VILLE, and to DILOLO, apart from the initial days of Operation DILOLO, supplies to there were maintained satisfactorily over an overall distance of 400 miles.

Engineers

The Engineer Section consisting of two NCOs and three OR was under the control of Comdt John CONNOLE. This section did much valuable work, despite lack of materials, suitable serviceable hand tools and certain trades, particularly plumbers and electricians. Their work varied from replacing of electrical wiring to inspection of dangerous explosives, in conjunction with ordnance personnel. These inspections mainly concerned recovered warlike stores consisting of large numbers of bombs, anti-tank grenades, anti tank and anti personnel mines, explosives, detonators, white phosphorous grenades and SAA. In addition, Comdt CONNOLE disposed of numerous unexploded bombs of various types which became uncovered from time to time at KOLWEZI airport. It deserves mention too to say that Comdt CONNOLE, apart from his engineer work, was for some time Battalion Security Officer and later Camp Commandant at Camp RUWE. The latter required considerable attention, supervision of duties, arranging accommodation, etc. and his diplomatic approach in dealing with 'the residents' did much to maintain peace.

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Transport

Transport in the battalion got off on the wrong foot. The vehicles handed over to it were in extremely poor condition due to extended service in the Congo. Initial replacements were received only as Operation DILLOLO was about to begin. These replacements consisted of jeeps and two tonners, taken from the Vehicle Salvage Dump at ELIZABETHVILLE. These vehicles were forwarded to KOLWEZI, being driven there by Danish drivers and by the time they arrived in KOLWEZI, of the 14 vehicles secured, six were already a 'write off'. This, then was the first issue to the 39 Battalion. That it was possible to keep sufficient in operation to cater for normal administrative and patrol movements is indicative of the true value of the transport section. It must be remembered that second line repairs and resupply of stores were practically non-existent.

Accidents

There were seven accidents in all. Five of these accidents occurred during the last six weeks and the drivers of the vehicles involved were personnel who did not hold AF 154 but were issued with UN permits as already mentioned. The figures for accidents were as follows:-

Staff vehicles	...	3
A Coy Gp	...	1
B Coy Gp	...	1
C Coy Gp	...	1
Cav Group	...	1

Only one of these accidents was of a serious nature. However, the injuries sustained were of a minor nature. In the other six accidents the damage to vehicles was slight and injuries were Nil.

Vehicles

<u>On Take over</u> (Ledger charge)	...	56
Recommended for cannibalisation (Class V)	...	24
Permanently in Workshops (awaiting major repairs or spares).		4
Vehicles on Road	...	28
<u>Handed over</u> (Ledger charge)	...	72
Recommended for cannibalisation (Class V)	...	52
Permanently in Workshops	...	1
Vehicles on Road	...	19

Clothing.

a. The issues of UN Clothing from Ireland were in the main sufficient with the following exceptions:-

- (1) Berets.
- (2) Sleevelets.
- (3) Ireland and UN Badges Sleeve.

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- b. The issue of one beret per individual was insufficient, as due to the dusty road conditions berets were quickly reduced to an unserviceable condition through wear on occasions when the wearing of berets was essential.

Sleevelets issued with the tropical walking-out uniform (2 per individual) were NOT sufficient as this issue did NOT permit of their being cleaned. The dye in Ireland badges ran badly when sleevelets were washed. This provided a difficulty as dry-cleaning was NOT available for a considerable time and then only for Officers.

- c. The tropical walking out uniform proved unsatisfactory in as much as material was a closely woven fabric and as such could be most uncomfortable even in the reasonable heat conditions encountered in KOLWEZI.
- d. The tropical walking out uniform worn by officers as "best wear" compared most unfavourably with the tropical uniforms of Officers of other nationalities in cut, style, material and fit.

Normal items of National issues which were used in the Congo proved satisfactory with the exception of leather boots. It was found that these ~~were~~ very quickly in the dry dusty conditions.

Issues of UN green tropical clothing were available on arrival due to the prior requisitioning by QM 38th Battalion. These uniforms were very suitable for service use in the tropical climate as they were of porous cotton material. Replacement issues were NOT permissible under UN regulations. However, after "Operation DILLOLO" special permission was received for an additional issue to each individual involved. This extra issue and the salvage of some uniforms enabled essential replacements to be made - as was necessary in the case of cooks, transport and signal personnel.

Clothing life was short in the main due to:-

- a. Lack of proper laundry facilities.
- b. Dusty conditions.

Ancillary Services.

Personal laundry facilities did NOT exist. Dry-cleaning contract was placed in August, 1963 but this contract catered for Officers only.

A boot repairing contract was placed in August also but this contract, due to default on the part of the contractor, proved unworkable.

The issue of an ancillary allowance in respect of boot repairing, laundry, and barbering was constantly sought but was NOT granted.

NO laundry facilities were available locally for Barrack Service items such as sheets and pillow-cases. All these items had to be sent to ELIZABETHVILLE (220 miles). It was found that most items received back from this laundry were torn and NOT properly laundered. This proved serious as NO replacements were available for these items.

Barrack Services.

Furniture of all types was in very short supply. Those items which were available were generally in very bad condition and in very many instances totally unserviceable. Replacements were NOT available.

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Some items of National delph were available. The UN issue of plastic eating utensils was available only in sufficient quantity to supply Officers' and NCO's Messes. It was found that these items discoloured rapidly and presented a very unhygienic appearance.

A reasonable amount of UN and National cutlery was available.

Ordinance and Equipment.

Climatic conditions did NOT cause any great deterioration of equipment as the battalion's tour of duty was mainly during the dry season. As the wet season began, a tendency for rust to form and leather to become mildewed was observed. Constant cleaning was necessary to maintain equipment free from dust, which was a constant problem.

National tentage as taken over was completely unserviceable due to its age and its extensive use in the Congo. Except for 160 tents shelter modified, for which replacements were NOT available from UN sources and which were required for patrols etc., all national tentage was surveyed and condemned.

UN tentage which was obtained as replacement was of excellent quality and condition. This tentage included dining halls. A point worthy of note in these tents was that all joinings were made by means of heavy type zip - fasteners, which made them completely waterproof and draughtproof.

National Web equipment proved uncomfortable and replacement by loose fitting battle-smocks with ample pockets would have been a great improvement.

Losses of web were minimum and disciplinary action was taken in all cases except on "Operation DILLOA". Losses on this operation were the subject of a Board of Inquiry and were accepted as a charge against UN.

Weapons as issued to Battalion were satisfactory.

Welfare.

The supply of national equipment brought out was sufficient, except that the Armoured Car Group was omitted from the allotment.

The UN equipment was requisitioned in May. It was not received until late August. This was due to lack of air transport in Leopoldville. The supplies received were good.

The total amount of National Welfare Equipment supplied was £600-0-0 approximately.

The Congo Comforts Committee supplied:-

280 lbs of Tinned Butter.
17 cwts of Sugar.

The Red Cross through the Army Canteen Board supplied:-

14 Tapes.

The supplies of PX merchandise stopped abruptly in July, due to alleged overspending of its quota by the Bn. The relevant UN regulation was NOT received until July, though dated December 1963. The local brewery was most co-operative in supplying 'Simba' and 'Tembo', but this was supplied in large bottles and was not suitable for storage in the household refrigerators.

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The local supply of minerals was not adequate during August, but after this the situation was excellent.

Final hand-over

Information that the 39 Battalion was to be replaced by the 2 Infantry Group did NOT reach 39 Battalion until after the bulk of the stores had been packed and loaded on to rail wagons. To retain equipment as was thought would be required - NO equipment lists had been received from Ireland - it was necessary to off-load some of the loads. This was done, and the equipment stored at Camp RUWE. After the main body of the 39 Battalion had left KOFI-EZI, two officers and six OR remained behind to complete the handover to the 2nd Infantry Group. This party included CQMS WALSH of B Company who volunteered to remain behind to assist the Q staff. His work in the latter days was on the same standard as his work previously with his company, a standard which was exceptionally high. The hand over of stores and stocks were completed prior to the rear party leaving Congo, though some adjustments were later necessary. Accommodation was handed over under UN supervision.

The rear party eventually returned by SABENA to BRUSSELS and by Air Lingus to DUBLIN. At BRUSSELS the Aer Lingus representative, on hearing of the party's arrival, came to the Airport, and used his good offices to have the officers of the party allowed through the Customs and escorted them for a brief visit to the city, a gesture much appreciated.

The seaborne stores eventually arrived in March 64 and were duly issued into Base Stores within some four weeks. Final adjustments were necessary due to some of the battalion stores having been retained in Congo for use by the 2nd Infantry Group, equipment NOT initially listed as being required. Within a matter of weeks, the accounts were closed and it was most satisfying to the Q staff to have an assurance from Finance Branch that all was in order and cleared.

The successful completion of the undertaking was a triumph of teamwork and organisation. Under the direction of Cft D. O RIAIN, Bn QM, the various Q elements worked purposefully and harmoniously from the outset. These would, however, be the first to acknowledge that the factors which most contributed to the outcome were Cft O RIAIN's thorough grasp of the complexities of the problem, and his unrelenting determination to see it solved.

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UNIT HISTORY

39th INFANTRY BATTALION

PART IV: OPERATIONS - MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS

PATROLS:

- a. Patrol activities were a daily feature of Battalion operations. They varied from local patrols in KOLWEZI town to long-range patrols deep into Sector D area. The mission of local patrols was to keep law and order; while the larger and more distant patrols ensured the maintenance of UN freedom of movement and surveillance of the Sector in general. Patrols furnished a constant and reliable flow of information to Bn HQ and were, in fact, the primary source of information for intelligence estimates of the situation. Local patrols were instrumental in keeping potential riot-type situations from developing into serious affrays - such incidents occurred almost daily. While patrols were invariably arduous and difficult and a constant strain on the relatively small man-power available, and the inadequate transport resources of the Battalion, they were an invaluable aspect of operations. The personnel involved gained considerable experience and became notably proficient in patrolling.
- b. The following incidence of patrol activities, covering the period 1 May to 31 Aug in statistical form, indicates the extent of the Battalion's commitment in patrols:

Type of Patrol	No.	Composition	Task
Town Patrols	6 per day	MP Sec.	Patrol KOLWEZI town.
Town Patrols	2 per day	Armd C Sec.	Patrol KOLWEZI Town (increased to six daily from 6 May to 18 May).
Routine Patrols	16	1 Pl on APCs	Town or local area patrols
Fighting Patrols	1	Two Pls & Sec AFVs'	To dismantle ANC Barriers.
Search Patrols	8	Varied from three Coy Gps to one Coy. plus two Armd C Secs.	Cordoning areas of Search by Police and ANC.
Long Range Patrols	2	Coy Gp plus two Secs Armd C's.	Recce distant areas in Sector D - two to four days duration.
Recce Patrols	4	1 Pl plus 1 Sec Armd C's.	Road and Bridge recces.
Air Patrols	2	Offr. party	Air recce of Sector D.
Jadotville Patrol	Wkly	1 Pl plus 1 Sec Armd C's.	Recce rd KOLWEZI - JADOTVILLE (130 mls) - two day task.

ADDITIONAL TRAINING:

Additional training consisted in the main of:--

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- a. Preparation of Post defensive plans, digging, communications, exercises, familiarization and recce exercises and an overall plan for action by the Bn in:-
 - (1) Local security.
 - (2) Aid to Civil Power.
- b. Training of additional drivers for Swedish & American APCs, Firing of APC Weapons, Mounting & Dismounting Exercises, Convoy Control, Security at the Halt and on the Move, Short Patrols. This training led to Routine Drills and to all-round knowledge of requirements of Rations, Water, POL, Repair and Cooking for Long Patrols.
- c. Cordon and Search Exercises. This aspect of "Keeping the Peace" was most essential and proved invaluable at a later stage ("Ratissage" Operations). These exercises emphasised the necessity for Secrecy, Security, Planned Recce and Proper Use of Men, Vehicles, Weapons and Size of Task Forces.
- d. Lectures initially to Officers on the Bantu Mind, so that a better understanding of the thinking and ways of the Congolese and ANC was achieved. This, in turn, led to more friendliness and a better exchange of views and was climaxed when combined ceremonial parades were held and Conferences between Civil Administrators and ANC could be conducted without any difficulty by the Bn.

PHYSICAL TRAINING:

Physical Training was part of normal routine and personnel of the Bn were in good physical condition generally. Very little was done at Endurance Training. One effort of two hours marching from 1030 to 1230 by a party of Pl strength was carried out. The Tps were tired and irritable on conclusion of the march. As a result, more emphasis was put on Physical Training and a very comprehensive programme of active Recreational Training was insisted on for all personnel.

Endurance Training and Physical Training are a necessity for Troops going overseas particularly in view of strange conditions of service.

ARMAMENT - REMARKS ON SUITABILITY

BN S A WEAPONS:

- a. The Bn was armed with:-

- (1) .45 Revolvers.
- (2) Gustaf SMGs.
- (3) FN Rifles.
- (4) Bren LMGs.
- (5) 84 mm Atk RCLs.
- (6) 81 mm Med Mors.
- (7) .303 MMGs.

and

in res. - 60 mm Lt Mors.

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- b. The SA Armament of the Bn was good. It lacked one type of wpn, only - a hy Atk RCL or Bazooka.

HY WEAPONS:

The Bn lacked any type of hy Sp wpns, which, as a result, compromised its security and reduced its combat capability considerably, more especially when such wpns were not readily available from higher sources.

ARMD Cs:

The Ford Armd Cs were most useful in the situation which prevailed - because of their excellent mechanical reliability. Otherwise these AFVs were too deficient in armament and armour, by modern standards, to be employed in a situation where they could be opposed by modern atk wpns or AFVs.

The APCs, Swedish and American, which were issued to the Bn from UN sources were excellent. They dominated the disturbances which the Bn were forced to quell, reduced the number of personnel required in any sit, and were of very great benefit to the Bn in every way.

EQUIPMENT - GENERAL REMARKS

Operationally, two serious deficiencies arose in the Bn and continued to create difficulties throughout the tour of duty:

- a. Tpt.
b. Comms.

TPT

The allotment of vehicles to the Bn was grossly inadequate. The mechanical condition of the vehicles in the Bn was seriously unreliable. The Bn was not organised to carry out the major repair and maint required. The rear maint area, responsible for such repair did not function as far as the Bn was concerned. Bn personnel who drove vehicles were noticeably below the standard of other European personnel in maintaining their vehicles in first class condition.

The tpt situation in the Bn was NOT good.

COMMS:

Static Comms to the higher HQ were satisfactory but sufficient operators were not provided in the estab. The position was made worse because the rear link to Kat Comd, in E'ville, had to be manned by personnel from the Bn.

Comms for patrols, furnished by the C 12 set, were unreliable and more often non-existent. Such patrols were a principal feature of the mission of the Bn and a daily requirement. The non-availability of Comms between patrols and Bn HQ created an undue risk, which, in a different situation, would have been so unacceptable as to require cancellation of patrols.

The Comms situation in the Bn for operational purposes were NOT good.

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LANGUAGE PROBLEMS.

Many difficulties arose because of a shortage of French speaking personnel in the Bn for while proficiency in French would NOT have solved all the language problems in this situation, it would have overcome most difficulties.

The European population were almost exclusively French speaking, as were the educated Congolese. Many of the Europeans, however, had a slight knowledge of English; some - not more than 5 per cent - were quite fluent.

Even among the Africans themselves there were difficulties as Kiswahili is the language of the region, while Lingala is the Official language of the ANC. Some ANC men however, had Kiswahili.

ONUC supplied the Bn with four interpreters whose only qualification was to interpret English-Kiswahili. In many situations involving the ANC this was quite useless.

ORG AND ESTABS - REMARKS

GENERAL

- a. Tables of org and estabs and annexures showing allotment of wpns, ammo and eqpt are attached to this report.
- b. The overall estab, from an operational point of view, was unsatisfactory in two respects:
 - (1) Coy Gps were, numerically, too weak.
 - (2) The org provided no hy sp unit.
 - (3) Ops - Int was utterly under staffed.
- c. The str of each Coy Gp was 103 which was approx 75 below a normal combat coy estab. Within the Bn there were three coys instead of the normal four. Within the coy there were two R Pls instead of three, and rifle sections were reduced from the normal ten-man section to an eight-man section.
- d. The reduction in strength also meant that, as there was a disproportion of senior officers, the incidence of duty for junior officers was high. The incidence of duty was unduly heavy for other ranks.
- e. Although combat operations had ceased in Jan/Feb '63 there still remained in April much operational and intelligence staff work to be done, for which Comdt J.E. WHITE was solely responsible.

As a result, a great burden of responsibility rested on him in his dual capacity, and his output of work during the period May - Sept was tremendous, e.g. OOs as required; planning patrols, briefing, debriefing of patrol comds; security systems within the Bn; planning and advising on means for securing safety of population from ANC and other menaces; keeping KAT command fully informed on developments.

Despite the volume of work, tribute was paid to the quality of 39 Bn Int reports by IG2 : ONUC HQ who stated that for accuracy, clarity and reliability, they were unequalled in ONUC at that time.

These expedients in estabs, designed to comply with UN requirements, were unreasonable and hazardous for the following reasons:-

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- a. No res, or reinf capability of suitable str, existed within the unit had it been committed to combat.
- b. The location of the unit, and the lack of an immediate reinforcing capability of the higher fm, would have placed the Bn in a most difficult sit had it been committed to combat.
- c. Tasks were allotted by the higher HQ to the Bn in a fashion which suggested that little or no cognisance was taken of the reduced str of the unit. In a combat sit this would have been perilous.
- d. Because of these tasks, and the sit which prevailed, all pers, especially ORs, were required to perform an unreasonable amount of duty.
- e. No Int staff as such was provided although Int reports were a major requirement demanded by the higher HQ.
- f. The other Bns in Kat Comd, Indo and Eth, had a str of between 700 to 800 all ranks - which, obviously, reflected a flexible policy on str in O.N.U.C.

Hy Sp Units

No Hy wpns were allotted to the Bn - in conformity with U.N. policy. Such a hazard would have been lessened if hy sp units were on call for immediate re-inf. In fact the Bn could NOT expect such sp in the situation which prevailed. Leaving a unit in an isolated posn without normal sp wpns - such as hy atk wpns, hy mors and/or fd arty - was not sound.

Armd C Gp:

Because of its suitability for patrols this sub-unit was continuously called on to furnish such duties. The low str of the Gp (31) created considerable hardship for ORs.

Str V Commitments:

The str of the unit was much too low for its commitments, and its security, for example:-

- a. During May 1963 the supply line of the Bn extended from E'ville to Lilolo, a distance of 463 miles, which required the setting up of three separate adm staffs.
- b. For one-third of its tour the Bn was responsible for garrisoning three permanent Stations and five Outposts and at the same time fulfilling its operational commitments.
- c. During a period in July when area patrol activities were temporarily suspended, due to extensive security measures set up in KOLWEZI town, the unit availability state read as follows:-
 - (1) Stand-to Force and Pls at short-notice - Three Pls.
 - (2) Outposts and permanent Airfield security forces ditto.
 - (3) Twenty-four hr guards and Barrier duties - Two Pls.

The balance - one Pl and Armd C Gp (minus) - remained freely available.

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Liasion

At an early stage of the mission the need for a Bn LO at HQ KAT COMD became obvious to deal with both ops and adm matters. Capt K.P. KNIGHTLY, Armd C Gp, filled this part and throughout the tour of duty of the Bn performed his duties in a most efficient manner.

CONCLUSION:

It will be apparent that the Battalion was, numerically, over-extended and it was a matter of good fortune that a situation did not arise to demonstrate this fact more seriously. It would be unsound to endeavour to repeat an operation in similar circumstances without a normal strength unit.

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UNIT HISTORY

39th INFANTRY BATTALION

UNIT NOMINAL ROLL

(22nd April, 1963)

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

OC	(Lt-Col)	0.4946 Lt Col DEMPSEY, Patrick J.	3 Inf Bn.
2IC	(Comdt)	0.4955 Comdt HASSEY, Michael D.	HQ, S Comd.
Ops Offr	(Comdt)	0.5781 Comdt WHITE, John E.	AHQ.
Adj't	(Comdt)	0.5964 Comdt RONAYNE, John O.	2 Bde.
QM	(Comdt)	0.7110 Comdt Ó RÍAIN, Diarmuid.	Mil Col.
Legal Offr	(Comdt)	0.6536 Comdt McMAHON, Thomas M.	HQ W Comd.
Welfare Offr	(Capt)	0.7425 Capt O'CONNOR, Laurence, G.	Mil Col.
Legal Offr	(Comdt)	Comdt GILL, Michael (replaced Comdt McMAHON) 17 JUNE.	HQ S Comd.

HEADQUARTER COMPANY

Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	(Comdt)	0.5256 Comdt NULTY, Patrick A.	Depot Ord.
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"A" Platoon

MP Offr & Pl Comd (Capt)	0.6229 Capt	DEVEREUX, John J.	6 MPC Coy.
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"Q" Platoon

Asst QM & Pl Comd (Capt)	0.7558 Capt	MORIARTY, Thomas J.J.	2 Bn.
Engr Offr (Capt)	0.5778 Comdt	CONNOLE, John P.	Mil Col.
Ord Offr (OME) (Capt)	0.6415 Comdt	WALSH, Edward.	2 Gar Coy.

Signal Platoon

Pl Comd (Lt)	0.7819 Lt.	LUNNEY, Liam J.	Sig Sqn.
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Transport Platoon

Pl Comd (Lt)	0.7575 Capt	DALY, Daniel J.	Depot S&T.
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Medical Platoon

Pl Comd (MO) (Comdt)	0.6291 Comdt	SULLIVAN, Anthony McA.	3 Hosp Coy.
Pl Offr (MO) (Comdt)	0.8007 Capt	O'RIORDAN, Thomas M. (replaced by 0.7075 Comdt SHEEHAN, James S.)	3 Hosp Coy.

Attachments

Chaplains (2)	Rev. Fr. MATTHEWS, Colm - C.F.
	Rev. Fr. NEVILLE, Ronald, J.C.F.

"A" Company Group

Company Headquarters

Coy Comd (Comdt)	0.5042 Comdt	AHEARNE, John.	5 Inf Bn.
2IC & Adm Offr (Capt)	0.7378 Capt	FLEMING, Francis A.	McKee Bks Coy.

Sp Platoon

Pl Comd (Capt)	0.7475 Capt	HEALY, Thomas.
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Rifle Platoons (2)

Pl Comds (2) (Lt)	0.7810 Lt.	Ó RÍAIN, William C.	5 Inf Bn.
(Lt)	0.7904 Lt.	MORTELL, James A.V.	8 Inf Bn.

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UNIT HISTORY

39th INFANTRY BATTALION

UNIT NOMINAL ROLL

(22nd April, 1963)

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

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Welfare Offr	(Capt)	O.7425 Capt O'CONNOR, Laurence, G.	Mil Col.
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HEADQUARTER COMPANY

Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	(Comdt)	O.5256 Comdt NULTY, Patrick A.	Depot Ord.
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"A" Platoon

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"Q" Platoon

Asst QM & Pl Comd (Capt)	O.7558 Capt	MORIARTY, Thomas J.J.	2 Bn.
Engr Offr (Capt)	O.5778 Comdt	CONNOLLY, John P.	Mil Col.
Ord Offr (OME) (Capt)	O.6415 Comdt	WALSH, Edward.	2 Gar Coy.

Signal Platoon

Pl Comd (Lt)	O.7819 Lt.	LUNNEY, Liam J.	Sig Sqn.
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Transport Platoon

Pl Comd (Lt)	O.7575 Capt	DALY, Daniel J.	Depot S&T.
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Medical Platoon

Pl Comd (MO) (Comdt)	O.6291 Comdt	SULLIVAN, Anthony McA.	3 Hosp Coy.
Pl Offr (MO) (Comdt)	O.8007 Capt	O'RIORDAN, Thomas M. (replaced by O.7075 Comdt SHEEHAN, James S.)	3 Hosp Coy.

Attachments

Chaplains (2)	Rev. Fr. MATTHEWS, Colm - C.F.
	Rev. Fr. NEVILLE, Ronald, J.C.F.

"A" Company Group

Company Headquarters

Coy Comd (Comdt)	O.5042 Comdt	AHEARNE, John.	5 Inf Bn.
2IC & Adm Offr (Capt)	O.7378 Capt	FLEMING, Francis A.	McKee Bks Coy.

Sp Platoon

Pl Comd (Capt)	O.7475 Capt	HEALY, Thomas.
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Rifle Platoons (2)

Pl Comds (2) (Lt)	O.7810 Lt.	Ó RÍAIN, William C.	5 Inf Bn.
(Lt)	O.7904 Lt.	MORTELL, James A.V.	8 Inf Bn.

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"B" COMPANY GROUP

Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	(Comdt) 0.6399	Comdt	YOUNG, Edward D.	4 Inf Bn
2IC & Adm Offr	(Capt) 0.5638	Capt	MORONEY, James.	3 AA Bty.

Sp Platoon

Pl Comd	(Capt) 0.7581	Capt	O'DONOVAN, Francis B.	22 Inf Bn.
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Rifle Platoons (2)

Pl Comds (2)	(Lt) 0.7636	Lt.	MULLOWNEY, Finton L.	12 Inf Bn.
	(Lt) 0.7907	Lt.	EGAR, William.	11 Inf Bn.

"C" Company Group

Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	(Comdt) 0.4961	Comdt	MADDEN, William	HQ W/Comd.
2IC & Adm Offr	(Capt) 0.7490	Capt	CLARKE, John	3 Inf Bn.

Sp Platoon

Pl Comd	(Capt) 0.7457	Capt	HUME, Arthur	18 Inf Bn.
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Rifle Platoons (2)

Pl Comds (2)	(Lt) 0.7839	Lt	CASEY, Martin J.	1 Inf Bn.
	(Lt) 0.7846	Lt	MULCAHY, Patrick M.	3 Inf Bn.

ARMoured CAR GROUP

Group Headquarters

Gp Comd	(Comdt) 0.5170	Capt	KELLEHER, Columbeille	T.O.S.
2IC & Tech Offr	(Capt) 0.7295	Capt	HENNESSY, John	Mil Col 1 Mot Sqn

Armd Car Secs

Sec Comds (3)

(Lt)	0.7645	Lt.	KNIGHTLEY, Kevin P.	2 Mot Sqn
(Lt)	0.7954	2/Lt	COCKE, Patrick L.	4 Mot Sqn.
(Lt)	0.7960	2/Lt	COTTER, Francis D.	1 Armd Sqn.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

74305	BSM	WHYTE, G.	1 AA Trg Regt.
807555	Sgt	GRIFFIN, J.	Depot Sigs
809928	Am	SHEAHAN, J.	Air Corps.

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HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

68224	CS	McNAMARA, P.	Depot S&TC.
71493	CQMS	NOLAN, J.	GT Depot.
810720	Cpl	DANHER, J.	Army App School.
803495	Cpl	DOWNES, H.	2 Garr Coy MPC
813000	Pte	HUTCHINSON, P.	3 Inf Bn.
808816	Pte	BEHAN, M.	12 Inf Bn
812724	Pte	JONES, N.	4 Inf Bn.

"A" PLATOON

86572	Sgt	CASHMAN, J.	Depot MPC
96384	Sgt	FENLON, M.	6 Inf Bn.
808279	Sgt	HEALY, M.	2 FA Regt.
431731	Sgt	WILSON, P.	Depot MPC.
90868	Sgt	HAYDEN, D.	Depot MPC.
92082	Cpl	HEARNE, J.	3 Garr Coy MPC
96577	Sgt	BARTLEY, C.	HQ CTC.
88217	Sgt	TOBIN, P.	3 Inf Bn.
99696	Sgt	CANAVAN, P.	1 AA Trg Regt.
805223	Cpl	MOORE, T.	3 Inf Bn.
810103	Pte	FLYNN, C.	3 Inf Bn.
813083	Pte	MURPHY, V.	3 Inf Bn.
98164	Cpl	BRENNAN, J.P.	Depot MPC.
409855	Cpl	McQUAID, M.	2 Garr Coy MPC.
812211	Cpl	DALTON, J.	2 Garr Coy MPC.
97584	Cpl	GALLIGAN, P.M.	2 Garr Coy MPC.
804203	Cpl	O'BYRNE, G.	2 Garr Coy MPC.
109630	Cpl	DOYLE, M.	3 Garr Coy MPC.
91310	Cpl	CROWE, M.	3 Garr Coy MPC.
97332	Cpl	HENDERSON, G.	3 Garr Coy MPC.
806058	Cpl	RYAN, R.	4 Garr Coy MPC.
92420	Cpl	LANDERS, T.	Depot MPC.
68654	Cpl	CREEVY, M.	Depot MPC.

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4. RÚNDA

813014	Pte	CREEVY, L.	3 Inf Bn.
813002	Pte	HALLIGAN, M.	3 Inf Bn.
813001	Pte	SHERIDAN, T.	3 Inf Bn.
813004	Pte	SHERIDAN, J.	3 Inf Bn.
813013	Pte	THOMPSON, B.	3 Inf Bn.
813009	Pte	ELLARD, D.	3 Inf Bn.
813003	Pte	MURPHY, T.	3 Inf Bn.
813012	Pte	O'BRIEN, F.	3 Inf Bn.
810121	Pte	HOULIHAN, F.	3 Inf Bn.
204005	Cpl	McKNIGHT, W.	6 Inf Bn.
86000	Pte	O'BRIEN, J.	5 Inf Bn.

HQ Coy

"Q" PLATOON

202345	BQMS	FENNELLY, J.	5 Inf Bn
75304	CQMS	KELLY, J.	3 Garr Coy AOC
106922	CQMS	HURSON, P.	22 Inf Bn
74454	CS	CARROLL, G.	Depot AOC
80871	Sgt	CASEY, T.	1 Garr Coy AOC
208934	Sgt	BYRNE, A.	Depot AOC.
90298	Sgt	LOFTUS, C.	Army App School
804034	Sgt	GIBBONS, J.	2 Fd Coy COE.
92356	Sgt	DOWLING, J.	Western CHQ.
807243	Cpl	GREENE, R.	4 Garr Coy AOC
88718	Cpl	NACLE, W.	2 Garr Coy AOC
804726	Cpl	MURPHY, J.	1 Fd Coy COE.
810264	Cpl	QUINN, T.	1 Inf Bn
98709	Cpl	FRANCIS, J.	2 Inf Bn.
811807	Pte	CLARKE, J.	CT Depot (W)
811572	Pte	SHIELDS, F.	2 Fd Coy COE.
98400	Pte	BOWES, J.	CT Depot (S)
800184	Pte	DOWLING, J.	Depot COE
404351	Pte	GARVEY, E.	2 Fd Coy COE
807422	Pte	COLEMAN, B.	4 Fd Coy COE
807429	Pte	DONOHUE, P.	Depot COE

RÚNDA

RUNDA

"Q" PLATOON (Contd)

811333	Pte	KELLY, B.	CT Depot (E)
811250	Pte	TAPLEY, R.	2 Inf Bn.

SIGNAL PLATOON

59615	Sgt	MAPLES, T.	2 Fd Sigs
407883	CS	CAMPBELL, T.	Depot Sigs.
69240	CQMS	SMULLEN, P.	4 Fd Coy Sigs.
809924	Cpl	TWOHIG, M.	Depot Sigs.
803854	Cpl	CLARKIN, A.	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
811138	Sgmn	TERRY, M.	Depot Sigs.
809337	Cpl	HANNIGAN, W.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
811137	Sgmn	LACEY, M.	Depot Sigs.
811877	Sgmn	SHEEHAN, W.	Depot Sigs
812398	Sgmn	BROWN, J.	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
807932	Sgmn	PARLE, M.	Depot Sigs

TRANSPORT PLATOON

408057	Sgt	QUINN, T.	2 Inf Bn
420045	Sgt	MULLALLY, J.	4 Garr Coy S&TC.
211196	Sgt	RYAN, T.	2 Fd Coy S&TC.
812023	Cpl	NOLAN, P.	2 FA Regt.
803598	Cpl	McBRIDE, J.	6 Inf Bn
93648	Cpl	RYAN, J.	Depot S&TC.
807427	Pte	CURRAN, W.J.F.	4 Fd Coy S&TC.
807457	Pte	STANTON, J.	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
807426	Pte	CUNNINGHAM, P.	2 Fd Coy S&TC.
92101	Cpl	DOYLE, J.	Base W/Shops S&TC.
812884	Pte	ROGERS, J.	Depot S&TC.
804256	Pte	COLLIER, R.	Depot S&TC.
812552	Pte	PRENDERGAST, J.	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
806792	Pte	DUFFY, J.	4 Garr Coy AOC.
804281	Pte	MOORE, L.	11 Fd Coy S&TC.
811664	Pte	McCORMACK, R.	2 Fd Coy S&TC.
802819	Pte	CLARKE, J.	4 Inf Bn.
811467	Pte	McDERMOTT, M.	2 Fd Coy S&TC.

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MEDICAL PLATCON

88301	Sgt	LEAHY, J.	1 Hosp Coy AMC
103617	Sgt	COONEY, P.	2 Hosp Coy AMC
800957	Cpl	GARDINER, J.	3 Hosp Coy AMC
434908	Cpl	SADLER, E.	Depot AMC
812548	Pte	MEADE, D.	2 Hosp Coy AMC
91058	Pte	FLANAGAN, T.	2 Hosp Coy AMC
809279	Pto	GARDINER, P.	3 Hosp Coy AMC
91720	Pte	GRIFFIN, P.	3 Hosp Coy AMC
810828	Pte	O'NEILL, M.	1 Hosp Coy AMC
810801	Pte	LACKEY, M.	1 Hosp Coy AMC

A COY

COMPANY HQ

405923	CS	RYAN, J.	5 Inf Bn.
76164	COMS	BOYLE, T.	21 Inf Bn.
809982	Cpl	KEATING, J.	McKee Bks Coy.
87634	Cpl	MURPHY, T.	2 Hosp Coy AMC.
84258	Sgt	SHERIDAN, H.	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
92157	Cpl	ROGERS, G.	21 Inf Bn.
802415	Cpl	KEOGH, J.	6 FA Regt.
809767	Pte	DOYLE, P.	CLANCY Bks Coy.
95216	Pte	MAHONY, W.	O/Rs, CHQ E. Comd.
813521	Pte	ROBINSON, P.	2 Inf Bn.
805291	Pte	HALLEY, J.	2 Garr Coy S&TC.
85143	Pte	FINNEGAN, P.	2 Garr Coy S&TC.
811561	Cpl	SISK, W.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
811779	Pto	WELSH, E.	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
812900	Pto	LENIHAN, M.	2 Fd Coy S&TC.

RUNDA

7.

No 1 Pl

89560	Sgt	GOLDEN, K.	Army School of Music
811365	Pte	SHEERAN, P.	2 Inf Bn.
809951	Cpl	CAREY, S.	5 Inf Bn
809430	Cpl	MAHON, J.	10 Inf Bn
812950	Pte	KEATING, G.	5 Inf Bn.
812886	Pte	O'SULLIVAN, J.	5 Inf Bn.
812541	Pte	MURPHY, P.	2 Inf Bn.
812489	Pte	MULLEN, J.	5 Inf Bn.
809245	Fto	MCGRORY, P.	5 Inf Bn.
812701	Pte	REDMOND, J.	2 Inf Bn.
809994	Cpl	FENTON, J.	2 Inf Bn.
809457	Cpl	RODDY, J.	2 Inf Bn.
812827	Pte	KAVANAGH, L.	2 FA Regt.
811875	Pte	MCCRUDDEN, E.	2 Inf Bn.
811850	Pte	BARCO, J.	2 Inf Bn.
812840	Pte	BONNER, W.	2 Inf Bn.
812792	Pte	BIEWS, M.	5 Inf Bn.
810951	Pte	DUFFY, J.	2 Mot Sqn.
811326	Cpl	MULREADY, A.	5 Inf Bn.
811363	Cpl	KIELT, P.	5 Inf Bn.
810959	Pte	KEENAN, P.	2 Inf Bn.
812962	Pte	BRENNAN, J.	5 Inf Bn.
812850	Pte	GETTINGS, P.	2 Inf Bn.
810085	Pte	CASEY, T.	2 Inf Bn.
812857	Pte	SHANNON, T.	2 Inf Bn.
812367	Pte	HARRIS, B.	2 Mot Sqn.

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8.

2 RIFLE PLATOON

75504	Sgt	STYNES, T.	Army App School.
812566	Pte	BRADY, B.	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
811336	Cpl	MURPHY, J.	3 Inf Bn.
89730	Sgt	MURPHY, J.	HQ CTC
811584	Pte	O'SULLIVAN, T.	Depot COE.
811885	Pte	WARD, C.	Depot COE.
81114	Pte	O'BRIEN, J.	Mil College.
811299	Pte	MOLLOY, J.	Mil College.
801823	Pte	BREEN, G.	Mil College.
810512	Pte	ENRIGHT, E.	Mil College.
805317	Cpl	O'REILLY, W.	Army App School
811230	Cpl	MURPHY, E.	3 Inf Bn.
808622	Pte	MCCORMACK, T.	Army App School.
812644	Pte	McGANN, P.	McKee Bks Coy (Records CTC).
813006	Pte	KEENAN, M.	3 Inf Bn.
812188	Pte	PERCIVAL, P.	Depot Arty Corps.
812925	Pte	WHELAN, J.	3 Inf Bn.
813005	Pte	O'CONNOR, R.	3 Inf Bn.
98818	Cpl	MACKEY, J.	3 Inf Bn.
808916	Cpl	SPARROW, M.G.	GT Depot.
811884	Pte	FOGARTY, G.	Depot Arty Corps.
812532	Pte	MORIARTY, B.	3 Inf Bn.
813078	Pte	DUGGAN, W.	3 Inf Bn.
812808	Pte	GARRETT, D.	3 Inf Bn.
813077	Pte	QUIGLEY, J.	3 Inf Bn.
813335	Pte	DOWLING, T.	3 Inf Bn.

RÚNDA

RÚNDA

9.

SUPPORT PLN

806223	Pte	BEADY, W.	2 FA Regt.
802368	Cpl	DUFFY, F.	20 Inf Bn.
92209	Cpl	FRANEY, P.	9 Inf Bn.
810492	Cpl	PURCELL, J.	5 Inf Bn.
811633	Pte	McMAHON, F.	2 Inf Br.
812829	Pte	SHERIDAN, C.	2 Bde HQ.
812766	Pte	O'REILLY, S.	5 Inf Bn.
812970	Pte	KINSELLA, P.	2 FA Regt.
810973	Pte	SANE, P.	2 Inf Bn.
809402	Pte	O'SULLIVAN, M.	2 Inf Bn.
76188	Sgt	HALPIN, J.	6 FA Regt.
99568	Cpl	PRUNTY, E.	21 Inf Bn.
803348	Cpl	BOYLE, J.	21 Inf Bn.
812004	Pte	SKEHAN, M.	2 Inf Bn.
806390	Pte	O'NEILL, A.	2 FA Regt.
812221	Pte	O'NEILL, N.	2 Inf Bn.
810069	Pte	BONHAM, R.	2 Inf Bn.
810640	Pte	HUGHES, P.	2 Inf Bn.
811914	Pte	REGAN, P.	5 Inf Bn.
812420	Pte	ASHMORE, A.	2 FA Regt.
812058	Pte	MORGAN, A.	2 Inf Bn.
812461	Pte	SINNOTT, J.	5 Inf Bn.
92437	Sgt	O'NEILL, T.	8 Inf Bn.
97034	Cpl	DUFF, O.	7 Inf Bn.
94712	Cpl	NORRIS, F.	5 Inf Bn.
811999	Pte	BRENNAN, P.	5 Inf Bn.
811853	Pte	DUNNE, R.	5 Inf Bn.
810551	Pte	KAVANAGH, C.	2 Inf Bn.
804693	Pte	MURRAY, P.	2 Inf Bn.
813366	Pte	GALLAGHER, J.	2 Inf Bn.
813286	Pte	YEATES, A.	0/Rs CHQ E Comd.

RÚNDA

RUNDA

10.

B COMPANY

COY HQ

99377	Sgt	WOODS, P.	CT Depot (S).
76776	CQMS	WALSH, J.	4 Inf Bn.
808332	Cpl	O'REGAN, P.	4 Inf Bn.
415841	Pte	GUERIN, J.	4 Inf Bn.
803386	Cpl	FLEMING, T.	4 Fd Coy Sigs.
91711	Cpl	LACEY, W.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
99139	Pte	O'NEILL, R.	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
88214	Pte	MOLLOY, J.	CT Depot (S).
93185	Pte	RYAN, P.	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
87262	Pte	DOWNEY, R.	CT Depot (S)
806612	Pte	O'DEA, M.	3 Fd Coy Sigs.
93234	Pte	KELLEHER, L.	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
802436	Pte	DEASY, D.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
807961	Pte	KAVANAGH, S.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
76062	Pte	MCCARTHY, P.	1 Fd Coy S&TC.

RUNDA

RÚNDA

11.

3 RIFLE PLATOON

79703	Sgt	MEEHAN, J.	12 Inf Bn.
812155	Pte	DALY, P.	12 Inf Bn.
801338	Cpl	RYAN, J.	12 Inf Bn.
86303	Sgt	MARTIN, C.	23 Inf Bn.
801419	Pte	KENNEDY, N.	12 Inf Bn.
813021	Pte	MAHER, J.	12 Inf Bn.
812250	Pte	CONRAN, J.	12 Inf Bn.
811684	Pte	TURNER, P.	12 Inf Bn.
812897	Pte	CONAGHAN, J.	12 Inf Bn.
811683	Pte	HOGAN, J.	12 Inf Bn.
98320	Cpl	POWER, J.	12 Inf Bn.
87459	Cpl	HANTON, J.	12 Inf Bn.
807012	Pte	WALSH, P.	12 Inf Bn.
807124	Pte	POWER, P.	12 Inf Bn.
812888	Pte	MILLING, F.	12 Inf Bn.
812718	Pte	O'REILLY, W.	12 Inf Bn.
808872	Pte	LASTE, J.	12 Inf Bn.
812783	Pte	RYAN, P.	12 Inf Bn.
91960	Pte	WYNNE, D.	12 Inf Bn.
93633	Cpl	QUAD, J.	23 Inf Bn.
813176	Pte	SLATTERY, T.	12 Inf Bn.
812850	Pte	MEEHAN, D.	12 Inf Bn.
813046	Pte	WATTERS, W.	12 Inf Bn.
806149	Pte	HOLDEN, J.	12 Inf Bn.
812887	Pte	KIRWAN, M.	12 Inf Bn.
811072	Pte	McCABE, J.	12 Inf Bn.

RÚNDA

RUNDA

12.

4 RIFLE PLN

88296	Sgt	MOORE, P.	CHQ S. Comd.
808686	Pte	LEAHY, W.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
202577	Cpl	MURPHY, S.	13 Inf Bn.
73372	Sgt	KELLY, M.	3 Main Coy COE.
8126"3	Pte	LAWLOR, J.	4 Inf Bn.
811558	Pte	ATTRIDGE, A.	4 Inf Bn.
811870	Pte	MOONEY, S.	4 Inf Bn.
805872	Pte	THOMPSON, W.	CHQ S. Comd.
812051	Pte	TOHER, G.	4 Inf Bn.
812690	Pte	GUFFINS, J.	4 Inf Bn.
808655	Cpl	BUTLER, P.	13 Inf Bn.
99205	Cpl	MOLONEY, J.	14 Inf Bn.
806799	Pte	FAHY, P.	4 Inf Bn.
806202	Pte	COLLINS, J.	4 Inf Bn.
812561	Pte	QUIRKE, J.	4 Inf Bn.
812676	Pte	CASSIDY, T.	4 Inf Bn.
811695	Pte	MALONE, N.	4 Inf Bn.
812559	Pte	FARRISSEY, M.	CT Depot (S)
809281	Cpl	MOSS, P.	11 Inf Bn.
78605	Cpl	MYLER, T.	3 Garr Coy S&TC.
97480	Pte	O'CONNOR, N.C.	4 Inf Bn.
803668	Pte	HOGAN, R.	4 Inf Bn.
811899	Pte	DONOGHUE, J.	4 Inf Bn.
812562	Pte	DUNLEA, P.	4 Inf Bn.
811910	Pte	CAULFIELD, H.	1 Fd Coy COE.
811097	Pte	GRAHAM, W.	4 Inf Bn.

RUNDA

RUNDA

13.

Support Platoon "D" Coy

Platoon HQ

811668	Pte	AHERN, D.	4 Inf Bn.
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84 mm Atk Section

77895	Cpl	O'GORMAN, P.	4 Inf Bn.
806826	Pte	O'BRIEN, D.	4 Inf Bn
805146	Cpl	O'CALLAGHAN, M.	McKee Bks Coy
801389	Pte	HAYES, F.	4 Inf Bn
809205	Pte	BOURKE, W.	4 Inf Bn.
810956	Pte	DROUGHT, R.	4 Inf Bn.
805544	Pte	MCCARTHY, J.	4 Inf Bn.
810840	Pte	FALVEY, J.	CHQ S. Comd.
811685	Pte	O'MAHONY, C.	4 Inf Bn.

81 mm Mor Section

81911	Sgt	O'BRIEN, N.	4 Inf Bn.
811107	Cpl	MCGROARTY, N.	1 FA Regt.
812033	Cpl	MCGROARTY, D.	1 FA Regt.
803967	Pte	GRACE, P.	4 Inf Bn
812588	Pte	WEST, W.	4 Inf Bn
811678	Pte	SCARRY, P.	4 Inf Bn
811677	Pte	MURRAY, A.	4 Inf Bn
811058	Pte	NOONAN, R.	4 Inf Bn
812504	Pte	BERMINGHAM, W.	4 Inf Bn
812545	Pte	BREEN, R.	4 Inf Bn
812544	Pte	BREEN, A.	4 Inf Bn.
812871	Pte	BURKE, D.	4 Inf Bn.

MMG SECTION

99626	Sgt	SHAW, E.	4 Inf Bn
88404	Cpl	FOGARTY, P.	13 Inf Bn.
810740	Cpl	SHINKWIN, J.	CT Depot (S)
803355	Pte	BRENNAN, M.	4 Inf Bn.
811404	Pte	O'LOUGHLIN, T.	4 Inf Bn.
812499	Pte	COLLINS, E.	4 Inf Bn.
811660	Pte	RYAN, P.	4 Inf Bn.
812261	Pte	CRONIN, M.	4 Inf Bn.
812538	Pte	BURNS, M.	4 Inf Bn

RUNDA

RUNDA

14.

C COY

COY HQ

76916	CS	CARROLL, J.	4 FA Regt.
109648	CQMS	QUINLEN, E.	19 Inf Bn.
806204	Cpl	TYNAN, J.P.	CHQ W. Comd.
425332	Cpl	LYNCH, M.	6 Inf Bn.
88486	Sgt	POWER, J.	Depot Sigs.
811525	Pte	FURCAN, J.	4 Fd Sigs.
92859	Cpl	CASSIDY, F.	5 FA Regt.
92541	Pte	HEWITT, T.	4 Fd Coy COE.
70829	Pte	FORAN, A.	4 Fd Coy S&TC.
808756	Pte	SIMPSON, W.	Depot AMC.
91733	Pte	JOYCE, K.	4 Garr Coy S&TC.
812564	Pte	McKEON, M.	4 Garr Coy S&TC.
811456	Cpl	O'SULLIVAN, J.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
812438	Pte	O'SHEA, T.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
210199	Pte	FLAHERTY, D.	17 Inf Bn.

No 5 Pln

425402	Sgt	KELLY, T.	6 Inf Bn.
812061	Pte	DUNLEAVY, D.	5 Bde HQ.
90926	Cpl	McARDLE, J.	16 Inf Bn.
805888	Sgt	McGOWAN, M.	1 Inf Bn.
813183	Pte	MAHON, M.	4 FA Regt.
812761	Pte	WOODS, A.	1 Inf Bn.
813025	Pte	DOYLE, J.F.	1 Inf Bn.
812726	Pte	CAULFIELD, M.	1 Inf Bn.
813024	Pte	MERRIMAN, M.A.	1 Inf Bn.
813282	Pte	HIGGINS, G.	1 Inf Bn.
807828	Cpl	CURTIN, M.	6 Inf Bn.
807328	Cpl	MALONE, G.	6 Inf Bn.
813280	Pte	TUMULTY, P.	6 Inf Bn.
813052	Pte	WHITE, M.	6 Inf Bn.
813188	Pte	SWEENEY, J.P.	6 Inf Bn.
812771	Pte	BARR, P.	6 Inf Bn.

RUNDA

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15.

812772	Pte	O'DONNELL, P.	6 Inf Bn.
813039	Pte	CONNELLY, M.	1 Inf Bn.
804192	Cpl	DEVINE, J.	6 Inf Bn.
90831	Cpl	WADE, E.	16 Inf Bn.
812611	Pte	MCCROSSAN, P.	6 Inf Bn.
813271	Pte	KELLY, J.	6 Inf Bn.
813051	Pte	MANNION, J.	4 FA Regt.
812133	Pte	DONOHUE, E.	6 Inf Bn.
813186	Pte	McENTEE, P.	4 FA Regt.
812706	Pte	O'KANE, B.	6 Inf Bn.
<u>No 6 Pln</u>			
75190	Sgt	HOGAN, A.	GT Depot.
811908	Pte	MCORE, M.	Depot Sigs.
810126	Cpl	LENNON, J.	GT Depot.
433647	Sgt	KELLY, P.J.	Mil College
803300	Pte	McKANE, M.	Depot S&TC.
806247	Pte	KILLORAN, J.	Depot S&TC.
811880	Pte	REYNOLDS, A.	Depot Sigs.
812647	Pte	KEYES, P.	Depot S&TC.
812646	Pte	GUILFOYLE, J.	Depot S&TC.
812291	Pte	COX, P.	Depot S&TC.
89245	Cpl	BURNS, J.	Depot S&TC.
91462	Cpl	O'DONNELL, A.	Depot COE.
802927	Pte	FARRELL, C.	Depot COE.
808929	Pte	MCCORMACK, P.	GT Depot.
812924	Pte	STANFORD, M.	1 AA Trg Regt.
812280	Pte	O'NEILL, N.T.	Depot S&TC.
811399	Pte	MULLALLY, M.	Depot S&TC.
813147	Pte	HAVERN, O.	1 Garr Coy AOC.
91714	Cpl	QUINN, W.	Depot S&TC.
805114	Cpl	GAFFNEY, J.	Mil College.
811485	Pte	FINGLAS, M.	HQ CTC.

RÚNDA

16. RÚNDA

806434	Pte	BREEN, P.	GT Depot.
811826	Pte	HEALY, P.J.	Depot Arty Corps.
809822	Pte	STEVES, S.	GT Depot.
812531	Pte	CULLEN, M.	GT Depot.
811577	Pte	BURKE, P.	Depot S&TC.

SUPPORT PLATOON C COY

812818	Pte	POWELL, H.P.	4 Garr Coy AOC.
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84 mm ATK SECTION

807244	Cpl	FALY, M.	4 Garr Coy MPC
809084	Cpl	FEEHY, J.W.	6 Inf Bn.
810214	Cpl	NICEILL, J.	24 Inf Bn
808049	Pte	LYNCH, K.	4 Garr Coy AOC
808260	Pte	ELLIOTT, G.	4 Garr Coy AOC
813293	Pte	KELLY, C.	4 Fd Coy COE.
813257	Pte	DONOHUE, J.	6 Inf Bn.
804302	Pte	DUFFY, L.	6 Inf Bn.
813446	Pte	GOLDEN, J.	6 Inf Bn.

81 mm MORTAR SECTION

88868	Sgt	GRIMES, T.	4 FA Regt.
97811	Cpl	HOEY, A.	4 FA Regt.
809182	Cpl	CRAIG, A.	4 FA Regt.
813026	Pte	CREEVY, P.	4 FA Regt.
812603	Pte	CREEVY, T.	4 FA Regt.
87277	Pte	MOLLOY, C.	4 FA Regt.
804239	Pte	KELLY, P.	4 FA Regt.
813027	Pte	LYNCH, P.	4 FA Regt.
813268	Pte	MULLALLY, C.	4 FA Regt.
811978	Pte	MULLEN, B.	4 FA Regt.
807713	Pte	GAVIN, A.	4 FA Regt.
812777	Pte	GARR, P.	4 Garr Coy AOC.

RÚNDA

RUNDA

17.

SUPPORT PLATOON

MMG SECTION

74802	Sgt	JOYCE, P.	6 Inf Bn
84030	Cpl	MELLETT, J.	6 Inf Bn.
88511	Cpl	MCCORMACK, M.	6 Inf Bn.
811603	Pte	GLYNE, M.	6 Inf Bn.
86906	Pte	DUFFY, D.	6 Inf Bn.
811454	Pte	FLYNN, P.	6 Inf Bn.
80390	Pte	O'BRIEN, P.	6 Inf Bn.
803261	Pte	McMANUS, F.	4 Garr Coy AOC.
80113	Pte	HANNON, A.	4 Garr Coy AOC.

ARMED CAR GROUP

GROUP HQ

405782	CQMS	WHITE, J.	Cav Depot.
437729	CQMS	COOLEY, M.	2 Mot Sqn.
88071	Sgt	SWEENEY, P.	1 Tank Sqn.
88240	Sgt	MCDONALD, K.	1 Armd Car Sqn.
91433	Sgt	HACKETT, T.	3 Mot Sqn.
804643	Cpl	MCCAFFERTY, J.	2 Mot Sqn.
807447	Tpr	LAMBE, J.	1 Tank Sqn.
805278	Cpl	EVANS, D.	2 Mot Sqn.
811903	Tpr	PHILLIPS, F.	2 Mot Sqn.
812633	Tpr	WALKER, J.	2 Mot Sqn.
813376	Tpr	YEATES, E.	2 Mot Sqn.

1 Armd Car Section

85447	Sgt	O'CONNELL, M.	2 Mot Sqn.
807359	Cpl	O'KEEFE, S.P.	2 Mot Sqn.
812308	Tpr	McNALLY, T.	2 Mot Sqn.
812456	Tpr	WEAVER, P.	2 Mot Sqn.
812390	Tpr	GUDDEN, J.	2 Mot Sqn.

RUNDA

RÚNDA

18.

2 Armd Car Section

88419	Sgt	TENNYSON, J.	4 Mot Sqn.
95924	Cpl	KENEFICK, M.	3 Mot Sqn.
808925	Tpr	BYRNE, J.	4 Mot Sqn.
813081	Tpr	HAYLES, J.	4 Mot Sqn.

3 Armd Car Section

88343	Sgt	POWER, T.	1 Tank Sqn.
805316	Cpl	McELROY, E.	11 Mot Sqn.
811686	Tpr	GRIFFIN, J.	2 Mot Sqn.
812387	Tpr	KELLY, J.	2 Mot Sqn.
812600	Tpr	CAMPBELL, P.R.	2 Mot Sqn.

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RÚNDA

1. RÜNDA

UNIT HISTORY

39th INFANTRY BATTALION

CONSOLIDATED EQPT TABLE

ITEM	BN	HQ	Armd Car Gp	One Coy Gp		Three Coy Gps		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
FN Rifles	62	17	6	(76)	-	228	-	296	17	313
Gustaf Sub- Machine Guns	52	17	24	(20)	-	60	-	136	17	153
Bren LMG Mk III	8	3	1	(7)	-	21	-	30	3	33
81 mm Mortar	-	1	-	(2)	-	6	-	6	1	7
.303 MMG (Inf)	-	1	-	(2)	-	6	-	6	1	7
" " (Coy)	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6	-	6
84 mm Atk Rifles	2	2	3	(3)	-	9	-	14	2	16
<u>Comms Eqpt.</u>										
HRO Receiver	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Wrls Set No.C.12	1	8	3	(1)	-	3	-	7	8	15
Wrls Set No.31	-	5	6	(4)	-	12	-	18	5	23
Wrls Set No.88	-	2	-	(4)	-	12	-	12	2	14
Telephones	-	10	-	(6)	-	18	-	28	-	28
Switchboards WD 10 line	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Cable D 10 Twin- miles	1	-	-	(2)	-	6	-	7	-	7
Apparatus Cable laving	3	-	-	(1)	-	3	-	6	-	6
Battery Charging Plant	2	-	-	(1)	-	3	-	5	-	5
<u>Instruments & Fd Eqpt</u>										
Binoculars	19	-	8	(16)	-	48	-	75	-	75
Bicycles	5	-	-	(5)	-	15	-	20	-	20
Compasses	19	-	8	(20)	-	60	-	87	-	87
Map Cases	19	-	14	(20)	-	60	-	93	-	93
Protractors	19	-	8	(22)	-	66	-	93	-	93
Romers	19	-	14	(22)	-	66	-	99	-	99
Torches Complete	108	-	31	(120)	-	360	-	499	-	499
Watches	16	-	11	(9)	-	27	-	54	-	54
Whistles	108	-	31	(120)	-	360	-	499	-	499
Clasp Knives	108	-	31	(120)	-	360	-	499	-	499
Veray Light Pistols	8	-	7	(4)	-	12	-	27	-	27
Veray Lt Ctges- Red	96	-	84	(48)	-	144	-	324	-	324
Veray Lt Ctges- Green	96	-	84	(48)	-	144	-	324	-	324
Veray Lt Ctges- Illuminating	96	-	84	(48)	-	144	-	324	-	324

RÜNDA

UNIT HISTORY
39th INFANTRY BATTALION
CONSOLIDATED EQPT TABLE

ITEM	Bn HQ		Armd Car Gp		One Coy Gp		Three Coy Gps		TOTAL ALLOTMENT		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>Engr Tools and Eqpt:</u>											
Axes Felling or Hand	8	-	6	-	(11)	-	33	-	47	-	47
Axes Pick	20	-	6	-	(31)	-	93	-	119	-	119
Crowbars	5	-	6	-	(4)	-	12	-	23	-	23
Cutters Wire	5	-	6	-	(13)	-	39	-	50	-	50
Hooks Slashing	11	-	-	-	(31)	-	93	-	104	-	104
Saws Cross Cut	5	-	6	-	(2)	-	6	-	17	-	17
Saws Hand or Folding	5	-	-	-	(8)	-	24	-	29	-	29
Shovels or Spades	20	-	6	-	(31)	-	93	-	119	-	119
Sledges Steel	4	-	-	-	(3)	-	9	-	13	-	13
Wedges Steel Ast'd	24	-	-	-	(16)	-	48	-	72	-	72
Sandbags	-	8,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,000	8,000 (Bn Res)
Rope 50 ft. lengths	9	-	3	-	(13)	-	39	-	51	-	51

RUND A

3. RÚNDA

UNIT HISTORY

39th INFANTRY BATTALION

CONSOLIDATED AMMUNITION ALLOTMENT

AMN	TOTAL	AMN	TOTAL
1. <u>Ballistite Energa</u>	672	11. <u>60 mm Mor Smoke</u>	-
2. <u>.303 IMG Ball</u>	270,000	12. <u>81 mm Mor 14 lb HE</u>	720
3. <u>.303 IMG Tracer</u>	54,000	13. <u>81 mm Mor 7 lb HE</u>	1,440
4. <u>.303 MMG Ball</u>	135,000	14. <u>81 mm Mor Smoke</u>	360
5. <u>.303 MMG Tracer</u>	13,500	15. <u>84 mm Atk HEAT</u>	1,008
6. <u>.300 MMG Ball</u>	27,000	16. <u>Energa Atk HEAT</u>	205
7. <u>.300 MMG Tracer</u>	2,700	17. <u>No 36 HE Grenade</u>	1,152
8. <u>7.62 mm FN</u>	266,400	18. <u>Smoke Grenades</u>	600
		<u>Grenades</u>	400
		<u>Lachrymatory</u>	
9. <u>9 mm Gustaf SMG</u>	81,600	19. <u>Verex Lt Ctdgs</u>	
		<u>Red/Green (each)</u>	324
		<u>Illuminating</u>	648
10. <u>60 mm Mor HE</u>	-		

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RÚNDA

CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún.
(*Ceanncheathrú Cathláin, Ceanncheathrú Complachta, Buíon "A", Buíon "C",
Buíon Comharthaíochta, Buíon Iompair agus Buíon Liachta.*)

SONRAÍ (1)	Ceanncheathrú Cathláin (2)	Complacht Ceanncheathrún							Iomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún (10)
		Ceanncheathrú Complachta (3)	Buíon "A" (4)	Buíon "C" (5)	Buíon Comharthaíochta (6)	Buíon Iompair (7)	Buíon Liachta (8)	Iomlán Complacht Ceanncheathrún (9)	
Lefteanant-Chornail ...	1(a)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Ceannfoirt ...	5(b)	1(c)	—	—	—	—	2(d)	3	8
Captaein ...	1(e)	—	1(f)	3(g)	—	—	—	4	5
Lefteanaint ...	—	—	—	—	1(h)	1(h)	—	2	2
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH ...	7	1	1	3	1	1	2	9	16
Maor-Sháirsintí Cathláin	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cathláin ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Sáirsintí Complachta ...	—	1	1(j)	—	—	—	1	3	3
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Complachta ...	—	1	—	2(k)	—	—	—	3	3
<i>Sáirsintí:</i>									
Scrúdóirí Lón-Lámhaigh	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Saoir Armála ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Armadóirí ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Banna (1) ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Cléirigh ...	—	—	2(m)	—	—	—	—	2	2
Cócairí ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Tiománaithe I.M. ...	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
Innealltóirí-Teicneóirí	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Feisteóirí I.M. ...	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
Faisnéis ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Sreangadóirí ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Póilíní Airm ...	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	3	3
Bialann Oifigeach ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Oibritheóirí-Radio agus	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Líne ...	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	2
Buíon ...	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
Post ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Radio-Mheicneóirí ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Stóráilaithe ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
<i>Ceannairí:</i>									
Armadóirí ...	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	2
Banna (1) ...	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	3	3
Cléirigh ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Tiománaithe I.M. ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	2

TABLA 15AD (ar lean).

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CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún.
(Ceanncheathrú Cathláin, Ceanncheathrú Complachta, Buíon "A", Buíon "C",
Buíon Comharthaíochta, Buíon Iompair agus Buíon Liachta).

SONRAÍ	Complacht Ceanncheathrún								Iomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún
	Ceanncheathrú Cathláin	Ceanncheathrú Complachta	Buíon "A"	Buíon "C"	Buíon Comharthaíochta	Buíon Iompair	Buíon Liachta	Iomlán Complacht Ceanncheathrún	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Ceannairí (ar lean):</i>									
Innealltóirí-Teicneoirí	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Feisteoirí I.M. ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	2
Faisnéis ...	1(n)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Giollaí Liachta ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	3
Póilíní Airm ...	—	—	10	—	—	—	—	10	10
Oibrítheoirí—Radio agus Líne ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Radio-Mheicneoirí ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Stórálaíthe ...	—	1	—	2(k)	—	1	—	4	4
IOMLÁN O.N.C. ...	3	3	23	14	6	8	4	58	61
<i>Saighdiúirí Singil:</i>									
Banna (1) ...	—	—	10	—	—	—	—	10	10
Bearbóirí ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Gréasaíthe ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Cléirigh ...	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Cócairí ...	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	3
Tiománaithe I.M. ...	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	8	8
Innealltóirí-Teicneoirí	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	3
Feisteoirí I.M. ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	2
Dualgaís Ghinearálta ...	—	3(o)	—	—	—	—	—	3	3
Giollaí Liachta ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	6	6
Oibrítheoirí—Radio agus Líne ...	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	4
Stórálaíthe ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Taillíúirí ...	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	2
IOMLÁN SAIGHDIÚIRÍ SINGIL ...	—	4	11	9	15	10	6	45	45
IOMLÁN CÉIMEANNA UILE	10	8	35	26	12	19	12	112	112
<i>Ar Cheangal:</i>									
Séiplínigh ...	—	—	(2)	—	—	—	—	(2)	(2)

TÁBLA 15AD (ar lean).

Leasú Uimh. 23.

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CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

*Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún.
(Ceanncheathrú Cathláin, Ceanncheathrú Complachta, Buíon "A", Buíon "C",
Buíon Comharthaíochta, Buíon Iompair agus Buíon Liachta).*

Fonótaí

- | | |
|---|---|
| (a) Oifigeach i gCeannas. | (k) Tá san áireamh. 1: Dualgais Leasa. |
| (b) 1 Leas-Oifigeach i gCeannas.
1 Oifigeach Oibríochta.
1 Aidiúnach.
1 Ceathrúnach.
1 Oifigeach Dlí. | (l) Gníomhaíonn mar Giollaí agus
Reathaithe freisin. |
| (c) Ceannasaí Complachta. | (m) Tá san áireamh. 1: Dualgais Dlí
agus Oibríochta. |
| (d) 1 Ceannasaí Buíne (Oifigeach
Liachta).
1 Oifigh Buíne (Oifigeach
Liachta). | (n) Traenála mar griangrafaire freisin. |
| (e) 1 Oifigeach Leasa. | (o) Tá san áireamh—Giollaí Bialanna. |
| (f) 1 Oifigeach Póilíní Airm
agus Ceannasaí Buíne. | |
| (g) 1 Ceannasaí Buíne agus Ceathrúnach
Cúnta.
1 Oifigeach Ordanáis (IMO).
1 Oifigeach Innealltóireachta. | |
| (h) Ceannasaí Buíne. | |
| (j) Póilíní Airm. | |

Nóta:

Cuirfear san áireamh sa Tábla seo O.N.C. amháin agus 4 Saighdiúirí Singil traenála mar Gasra Sláinteolaíochta agus Níocháin.

TÁBLA 15AE.

Leasú Uimh. 23.

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CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

GRÚPA COMPLACHTA.

(Ceanncheathrú Complachta, dhá Bhuíon Muscaeid—trí Ghasra Muscaeid do gach Buíon—agus Buíon Tacaíochta amháin).

SONRAÍ	Ceanneathrú Complachta	Buíon Muscaeid Amháin	Dhá Bhuíon Muscaeid	Buíon Tacaíochta				Iomlán Grúpa Complachta
				Ceanneathrú	84 m.m. Gasra Frith-Tanc	81 m.m. Gasra Moirtéara	Gasra I.G.M.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Ceannfoirt ...	1(a)	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Captaein ...	1(b)	—	—	1(c)	—	—	—	2
Lefteanaint ...	—	(1)(c)	2	—	—	—	—	2
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH ...	2	(1)	2	1	—	—	—	5
Sáirsintí Complachta ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Complachta ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
<i>Sáirsintí:</i>								
Buíon ...	—	(1)	2	—	—	—	—	2
Gasra ...	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	2
<i>Ceannairí:</i>								
Uimhreacha Frith-Tanc ...	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3
Cléirigh ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Cócairí ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.E. 81 m.m. Uimhreacha ...	—	(3)	6	—	—	—	—	6
Moirtéara ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.M. Oibhritheoirí Radio agus ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
Líne ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Gasra ...	—	(3)(d)	6	—	—	—	—	6
Comharthóirí (e) ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Stóráilaithe-Tiománaithe ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
IOMLÁN O.N.C. ...	7	(7)	14	—	3	3	3	30
<i>Saighdiúirí Singil:</i>								
Uimhreacha Frith-Tanc ...	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6
Cócairí ...	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Tiománaithe I.M. ...	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	2

TÁBLA 15AE (ar lean).

Leasú Uimh. 23.

ó 24/4/63.

CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

GRÚPA COMPLACHTA.

(Ceanncheathrú Complachta, dhá Bhuíon Muscaeid—trí Ghasra Muscaeid do gach Buíon—agus Buíon Tacaíochta amháin).

SONRAÍ (1)	Ceanncheathrú Complachta (2)	Buíon Muscaeid Amháin (3)	Dhá Bhuíon Muscaeid (4)	Buíon Tacaíochta				Iomlán Grúpa Complachta (9)
				Ceanncheathrú (5)	84 m.m. Gasra Frith-Tanc (6)	81 m.m. Gasra Moirtéara (7)	Gasra I.G.M. (8)	
<i>Saighdiúirí Singil (ar lean):</i>								
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.E. 81 m.m. Uimhreacha Moirtéara	—	(6)	12	—	—	—	—	12
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.M. Oibhritheoirí Radio agus Líne	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	8
Muscaedíirí	—	(12)	24	—	—	—	6(f)	6
Comharthóirí (e)	—	(1)	2	1	—	1	—	24
Stóráilaithe-Tiomáraithe	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
								1
IOMLÁN SAIGHDIÚRÍ SINGIL	8	(19)	38	1	6	9	6	68
IOMLÁN CÉIMEANNA UILE	17	(27)	54	2	9	12	9	103

TÁBLA 15AE (ar lean).

Leasú Uimh. 23.

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CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

GRÚPA COMPLACHTA.

(Ceanncheathrú Complachta, dhá Bhuíon Muscaeid—trí Ghasra Muscaeid do gach Buíon—agus Buíon Tacaíochta amháin).

FONOTAI:

- (a) 1 Ceannasaí Complachta.
- (b) 1 Leas-Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Oifigeach Riaracháin.
- (c) Ceannasaí Buíne.
- (d) Is féidir Sáirsint amháin bheith san áireamh. Má cuirtear Sáirsint san áireamh méadúfear uimhir na Sáirsintí agus laghdúfear uimhir na gCeannairí dá réir.
- (e) Is féidir bheith san áireamh—Sreangadóirí.
- (f) Tá san áireamh—Raon-Toisire amháin.

Nótaí

Cuirfear san áireamh, sa TÁBLA seo.

- (a) Bearbóir amháin.
- (b) ONC amháin agus 4 Saighdiúirí Singil traenála mar Gasra Sláinteólaíochta agus Níocháin.

TÁBLA 15AF.

Leasú Uimh. 23.

ó 24/4/63.

CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

GRÚPA CARR ARMÚRTHA.

(Ceanncheathrú Grúpa agus trí Ghasra Armúrtha—Dhá Charr-Armúrtha Fórd do gach Gasra).

SONRAÍ	Ceanncheathrú Grúpa	Gasra Carr Armúrtha Ambhain	Trí Ghasra Carr Armúrtha	Iomlán Grúpa	FONÓTAÍ
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ceannfoirt	1(a)	—	—	1	(a) Ceannasaí Grúpa.
Captaein	1(b)	—	—	1	(b) Leas-Oifigeach i gCeannas 7
Lefteanaint	—	(1)(c)	3	3	Oifigeach Teicniúil.
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH	2	(1)	3	5	(c) Ceannasaithe Gasra.
Sáirsintí Complachta	1	—	—	1	(d) Breisíocht Faoisimh.
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Complachta	1	—	—	1	
Sáirsintí:					
Feisteóirí I.M.	2	—	—	2	
Gasra	1(d)	(1)	3	4	
Ceannairí:					
Feisteóirí I.M.,	2	—	—	2	
Oibritheóirí	1(d)	(1)	3	4	
IOMLÁN O.N.C.	8	(2)	6	14	
Trúipéirí:					
Gunnadóirí—Tiománaithe	1(d)	(2)	6	7	
Gunnadóirí—Oibritheóirí	1(d)	(1)	3	4	
Stóralaithe—Tiománaithe	1	—	—	1	
IOMLÁN TRÚIPÉIRÍ	3	(3)	9	12	
IOMLÁN CÉIMEANNA UILE	13	(6)	18	31	

NÓTAÍ:

Tarraingfear an pearsanra sa Tábla seo ón gCór Marcra.

TÁBLA 15AG.

Leasú Uimh. 23.

ó 24/4/63.

CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

(TABLA COMHDHLÚITE).

(Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún, Trí Ghrúpa Complachta agus Grúpa Carr Armúrtha amháin).

SONRAÍ.	Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún.	Grúpa Complachta Amháin.	Trí Ghrúpa Complachta.	Grúpa Carr Armúrtha Amháin	Iomlán Cathláin.	FONÓTAÍ.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lefteanant-Chornail ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Ceannfoirt ...	8	(1)	3	1	12	
Captaein ...	5	(2)	6	1	12	
Lefteanaint ...	2	(2)	6	3	11	
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH ...	16	(5)	15	5	36	
Maor-Sháirsintí Cathláin ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Cathláin ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Sáirsintí Complachta ...	3	(1)	3	1	7	
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Complachta ...	3	(1)	3	1	7	
<i>Sáirsintí:</i>						
Scrúdáirí Lón-Lámhaigh ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Saoir Armála ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Armadóirí ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Banna ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Cléirigh ...	2	—	—	—	2	
Cócairí ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Tiománaithe I.M. ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Innealltóirí-Teicneóirí ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Feisteóirí I.M. ...	1	—	—	2	3	
Faisnéis ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Sreangadóirí ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Póilíní Airm ...	3	—	—	—	3	
Bialann Oifigeach ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Oibrítheoirí Radio agus Líne ...	2	—	—	—	2	
Buíon ...	1	(2)	6	—	7	
Post ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Radio Mheicneóirí ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Gasra ...	—	(2)	6	4	10	
Stóráilaithe ...	1	—	—	—	1	
<i>Ceannairí:</i>						
Uimhreacha Frith-Tanc ...	—	(3)	9	—	9	
Armadóirí ...	2	—	—	—	2	

TÁBLA 15AG (ar lean).

Leasú Uimh. 23.

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CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

(TÁBLA COMHDHLÚITE).

(Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún, Trí Ghrúpa Complachta agus Grúpa Carr Armúrtha amháin).

SONRAÍ.	Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún.	Grúpa Complachta Amháin.	Trí Ghrúpa Complachta.	Grúpa Carr Armúrtha Amháin	Iomlán Cathláin.	FONÓTAÍ.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Ceannairí (ar lean):</i>						
Banna	3	—	—	—	3	
Cléirigh	1	(1)	3	—	4	
Cócairí	—	(1)	3	—	3	
Tiománaithe I.M.	2	—	—	—	2	
Innealltóirí-Teicneóirí	1	—	—	—	1	
Feisteóirí I.M.	2	—	—	2	4	
Faisnéis	1	—	—	—	1	
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.E.	—	(6)	18	—	18	
81 m.m. Uimhreacha						
Moirteara	—	(2)	6	—	6	
Giollaf Liachta	3	—	—	—	3	
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.M.	—	(2)	6	—	6	
Póilíní Airm	10	—	—	—	10	
Oibritheóirí	—	—	—	4	4	
Oibritheóirí — Radio agus						
Líne	1	(1)	3	—	4	
Radio Mheicneóirí	1	—	—	—	1	
Gasra	—	(6)	18	—	18	
Comharthóirí	—	(1)	3	—	3	
Stóráilaithe	4	—	—	—	4	
Stóráilaithe Tiománaithe	—	(1)	3	—	3	
IOMLÁN O.N.C.	61	(30)	90	14	165	
<i>Saighdiúirí Singil:</i>						
Uimhreacha Frith-Tanc	—	(6)	18	—	18	
Banna	10	—	—	—	10	
Bearbóirí	1	—	—	—	1	
Gréasaithé	1	—	—	—	1	
Cléirigh	1	—	—	—	1	
Cócairí	3	(3)	9	—	12	
Tiománaithe I.M.	8	(2)	6	—	14	
Innealltóirí-Teicneóirí	3	—	—	—	3	
Feisteóirí I.M.	2	—	—	—	2	

TÁBLA 15AG (ar lean).

Leasú Uimh. 23.

ó 24/4/63.

CÓR COISITHE.

39 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

(TÁBLA COMHDHLÚITE).

(Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún, Trí Ghrúpa
Complachta agus Grúpa Carr Armúrtha amháin).

SONRAÍ	Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Complacht Ceanncheathrún.	Grúpa Complachta Amháin.	Trí Ghrúpa Complachta.	Grúpa Carr Armúrtha Amháin	Iomlán Cathláin.	FONÓTAÍ.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Saighdiúirí Singil (ar lean):</i>						
Gunnadóir-Tiománaithe ...	—	—	—	7	7	
Gunnadóir-Oibritheoirí ...	—	—	—	4	4	
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.E. 81 m.m. Uimhreacha	—	(12)	36	—	36	
Moirtéara ...	—	(8)	24	—	24	
Giollaí Liachta ...	6	—	—	—	6	
Uimhreacha Gunna I.G.M. Oibritheoirí Radio agus	—	(6)	18	—	18	
Líne ...	4	(2)	6	—	10	
Dualgais Ghinearálta ...	3	—	—	—	3	
Muscaedirí ...	—	(24)	72	—	72	
Comharthóirí ...	—	(4)	12	—	12	
Stóráilaithe ...	1	—	—	—	1	
Stóráilaithe-Tiománaithe ...	—	(1)	3	1	4	
Tailliúirí ...	2	—	—	—	2	
IOMLÁN SAIGHDIÚIRÍ SINGIL ...	45	(68)	204	12	261	
IOMLÁN CÉIMEANNA UILE ...	122	(103)	309	31	462	


NÓTAÍ BREISE:

Tarraingfar na pearsanra sa Tábla seo ó Fhoirne agus Aonaid eile atá in iomlán na mBunaíochta Síochána agus fanfaidh siad ina gcomhaltáí de, na cóir seirbhíse ón ar tarraingeadh iad.

UNIT HISTORY: 39th INFANTRY

SKETCH SHOWING PRINCIPAL FEATURES:

SCALE: 1/1,000,000: AS IN





BATTALION

S IN SECTOR "D"


JUNE 1963

RUNDA



RHODESIA

RUNDA



UNIT HISTORY: 39th TRENCH BATTALION

SKETCH SHOWING THE SECTORS OF KATANGA COAST AND PRINCIPAL TOWNS: JUNE 1963

SCALE: 1/3,000,000

RUNDA

ALBERTVILLE

TANGANYIKA

KATANDA

SECTOR "C"

KAMUNA

ANGOLA

SECTOR "D"

DILOLO

KOLNEZI

ANGOLA

SECTOR "E"

SECTOR "B"

JADOTVILLE

ELIZABETHVILLE

ZAMBIA

ZAMBIA

RUNDA